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The Concept of Extra-Constitutional
Executive Power in Domestic Affairs
by GEORGE WINTERTON*
Introduction
A recurrent theme of the jurisprudence of the executive power of
the United States is the attribution to the President of power to take
whatever action he believes necessary for the welfare of the United
States. The classic exposition of this doctrine-the "stewardship" the-
ory of presidential power-is that of President Theodore Roosevelt.
My view was that every executive officer, and above all every
executive officer in high position, was a steward of the people
bound actively and affirmatively to do all he could for the people,
and not to content himself with the negative merit of keeping his
talents undamaged in a napkin. I declined to adopt the view that
what was imperatively necessary for the Nation could not be
done by the President unless he could find some specific authori-
zation to do it. My belief was that it was not only his right but his
duty to do anything that the needs of the Nation demanded un-
less such action was forbidden by the Constitution or by the laws
.. . . In other words, I acted for the public welfare, I acted for
the common well-being of all our people, whenever and in
whatever manner was necessary, unless prevented by direct con-
stitutional or legislative prohibition.'
Notwithstanding the opposition of ex-President Taft' and others,3 sub-
sequent Presidents have taken a similar view of their authority,4 even
* Senior Lecturer in Law, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia. LL.B.,
1968, University of Western Australia; LL.M., 1970, University of Western Australia.
1. T. ROOSEVELT, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 389 (1913).
2. W. TAFT, THE PRESIDENT AND His POWERS 139-40, 144 (1916).
3. See, e.g., N. SMALL, SOME PRESIDENTIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE PRESIDENCY
43 (1932); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 103 F. Supp. 569, 575-76 (D.D.C.),
afid, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
4. See, e.g., President Truman: "ITihe power of the President should be used in the
interest of the people, and in order to do that the President must use whatever power the
Constitution does not expressly deny him," quotedin M. CUNLIFFE, AMERICAN PRESIDENTS
AND THE PRESIDENCY 343 (2d rev. ed. 1976); A. SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY
143 (1973); R. Longaker, in C. RoSSITER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMANDER IN
CHIEF XV-xvii (Expanded ed. 1976). For a discussion of President Nixon's broad view of
executive power, see A. SCHLESINGER, supra, at 263-66; note 84 infra. Judges, too, have
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asserting, on occasion, a power to act in defiance of Congress.5
Apart from the authority delegated by Congress, there are three
possible bases for a presidential power of "stewardship" proportions,
and all have been relied upon by its proponents. It has, first, been as-
serted that the President has these broad powers because they are "ex-
ecutive" in nature and, hence, conferred upon him by article II of the
Constitution,6 which vests "[t]he Executive power" in the President of
the United States.7 Secondly, it may be argued that, even if the first
clause of article II is not itself a grant of all powers by nature "execu-
tive," very broad authority can be implied from the powers expressly
conferred upon the President by article II of the Constitution, espe-
cially his powers as commander-in-chief of the armed forces,8 and his
duty (and, hence, power) to "take care that the laws be faithfully exe-
cuted."9 Thirdly, if it is found that the first two sources are inadequate
to support such broad presidential competence, it may be claimed that
the power to act, at least until Congress provides otherwise, is derived
from the people by means other than a constitutional grant.
Although it may be important to ascertain the source of an as-
serted presidential power when considering whether the President is
subject to congressional supervision, l0 advocates of the "stewardship"
theory have often been most unspecific on the question. An example is
the exchange between Assistant Attorney General Baldridge and Judge
occasionally expressed executive power in very broad terms: see, e.g., Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 662 (1952) (Clark, J., concurring); id at 691-92 (Vinson,
C.J., dissenting, quoting the brief of Solicitor General John W. Davis in United States v.
Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915)). In fact, Vinson based his decision on a narrower
ground-the President's duty to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed" (U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 3), 343 U.S. at 701-04, 708-10. See also New York Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713, 729-30 (1971), where Stewart, J., concurring, spoke of the President's
constitutional duty "as a matter of sovereign prerogative" to protect confidentiality of infor-
mation relating to foreign affairs and national defense.
5. See President Roosevelt's address to Congress regarding the Emergency Price Con-
trol Act, September 7, 1942, quoted in E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE AND POWERS
1787-1957 at 250-51 (4th ed. 1957).
6. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
7. See infra Part II, section B(l).
8. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
9. See id art. II, § 3.
10. As will be seen some executive powers are free from congressional control: this has
been claimed (incorrectly, we believe) for the President's power to send troops abroad, see,
e.g., Secretary of State Dean Acheson, quoted by Longaker, supra note 4, at 135; and also
for his power to negotiate with foreign governments, see United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936). See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976);
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 727 (1971); Myers v. United States, 272
U.S. 52 (1926).
[Vol. 7:1
Fall 1979] EXTRA-CONSTITUTIONAL EXECUTIVE POWER
Pine in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.I I
The Court:
Mr. Baldridge:
The Court:
Mr. Baldridge:
The Court:
Mr. Baldridge:
And is it. . . your view that the powers of the
Government are limited by and enumerated in
the Constitution of the United States?
That is true, Your Honor, with respect to legis-
lative powers.
But it is not true, you say, as to the Executive?
No.
So, when the sovereign people adopted the
Constitution, it enumerated the powers set up in
the Constitution but limited the powers of the
Congress and limited the powers of the judici-
ary, but it did not limit the powers of the Execu-
tive. Is that what you say?
That is the way we read Article II of the Consti-
tution.12
The thesis that some presidential powers are conferred extra-con-
stitutionally is surprising in the presence of a Constitution deriving its
authority from the people."3 Yet, the doctrine of extra-constitutional
powers has, generally, been accepted in the area of foreign affairs, 14 the
authoritative exposition being that of Justice Sutherland in United
States v. Curtiss- Wright Export Corp. 15 in 1936. Speaking for seven
members of the Supreme Court, 16 Justice Sutherland expounded gener-
ally upon the federal government's power over foreign affairs, although
the specific issue before the Court was a narrower one: whether Con-
gress may delegate broader authority to the President in foreign affairs
11. 103 F. Supp. 569 (D.D.C.), aft'd, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
12. J. SMITH & C. COTTER, POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT DURING CRISES 135 (1960).
See also, id at 173-74 n.10. Pine, D.J., noted Mr. Baldridge's arguments on "inherent"
power and rejected them, adopting ex-President Taft's view of executive power in the steel
seizure case: 103 F. Supp. 569, 572-74 (D.D.C. 1952). For Mr. Baldridge's second thoughts
regarding this argument, see M. MARCUS, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE: THE
LIMITS OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 306 n.89 (1977). On the widespread condemnation which
greeted Baldridge's original argument, see id at 124-26.
13. See U.S. CONST. preamble.
14. L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 25-6 (1972). However,
some judges have preferred to ground the foreign affairs powers of Congress and the Presi-
dent more securely on an implication from the express grants of power in the Constitution:
see New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728-29 (Stewart, J., concurring),
761 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (1971); Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 257 (1967). For criti-
cal comment on extra-constitutional power in foreign affairs, see R. BERGER, EXECUTIVE
PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 100-08 (1974); L. HENKIN, supra, at 19-28; Lofgren,
United States v. Curtiss- Wright Export Corporation: An Historical Reassessment, 83 YALE
L.J. 1 (1973).
15. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
16. McReynolds, J., dissented without opinion; Stone, J., did not participate.
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than in domestic matters.' 7 Justice Sutherland held that Congress
could delegate such authority,'I the powers of the national government
(Congress and the President) in foreign affairs having a juristic basis
different from those in domestic matters.' 9 Authority in the latter area
is limited to that granted by the Constitution, expressly or by implica-
tion,2" but the foreign affairs power is extra-constitutional, 2' because
the powers of "external sovereignty" passed directly from the British
Crown to "the colonies in their collective and corporate capacity as the
United States of America."22 The States (or colonies) severally never
enjoyed power over foreign affairs.23 Justice Sutherland concluded:
[T]hat the investment of the federal government with the powers
of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative
grants of the Constitution. The powers to declare and wage war,
to conclude peace, to make treaties, to maintain diplomatic rela-
tions with other sovereignties, if they had never been mentioned
in the Constitution, would have vested in the federal government
as necessary concomitants of nationality.24
Moreover, Justice Sutherland spoke of "the very delicate, plenary
and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal
government in the field of international relations."25 Notwithstanding
the description of the President's power as "exclusive,"26 it has been
17. Lofgren, supra note 14, at 6-12; United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 630 (3d
Cir.), cert. deniedsub nom. Ivanov v. United States, 419 U.S. 881 (1974).
18. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320-29 (1936).
19. Id at 315-16. Hence, Justice Sutherland's observations on the foreign affairs power
of the national government were not mere obiter dicta, see Lofgren, supra note 14, at 31,
although comment on the powers of the President independent of Congress was. See
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 636 n.2 (1952) (Jackson, J., concur-
ring).
20. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315-16 (1936).
21. Id at 318.
22. Id at 316-17.
23. Id at 316. Whether Justice Sutherland was historically accurate in this assertion is
still being debated. For support of Sutherland, see Morris, The Forging o the Union Recon-
sidered" A Historical Refutation of State Sovereignty Over Seabeds, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1056,
1060-89 (1974); Morris, "We the People f the United States' The Bicentennial of a Peole's
Revolution, 82 AM. HisT. Rav. 1, 14 (1977). For opinions contra, see R. BERGER, supra note
14, at 10 1-08; Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power. An Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland's
Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467, 478-90 (1946); Lofgren, supra note 14, at 17, 18, 29-30, 32; Patter-
son, In Re The United States v. The Curtiss- Wright Corfporation, 22 TEx. L. REv. 286, 445
(1944).
24. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936).
25. Id at 320. Sutherland, J., added that this power was one "which does not require as
a basis for its exercise an act of Congress, but which, of course, like every other governmen-
tal power, must be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitu-
tion." Id.
26. See id
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recognized that, as in most domestic matters, the President is not in-
dependent of congressional control across the whole gamut of foreign
affairs;2' he would seem to be free from congressional control only
where he can rely upon authority conferred by the Constitution, at least
impliedly, such as the power to negotiate with foreign nations.
28
While the Supreme Court has developed quite an expansive inter-
pretation of the government's foreign affairs power over a number of
cases,29 it has never had to consider a situation where the President
acted in that field against the will of Congress. ° Moreover, in speaking
of executive power over foreign affairs, the Court has usually been
careful to link it with the President's powers regarding treaties, 3I recog-
nition of foreign states and governments, 32 and national defense,33 all
27. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 636 n.2 (1952) (Jack-
son, J., concurring); United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 611, 627, 629-35 (3d Cir.), cer.
deniedsub nom. Ivanov v. United States, 419 U.S. 881 (1974); Consumers Union of U.S.,
Inc. v. Rogers, 352 F. Supp. 1319, 1322-23 (D.D.C. 1973), variedsub nom. Consumers Union
of U.S., Inc. v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136, 149, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Leventhal, J., dissenting)
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975); Sparkman, Checks and Balances in American Foreign
Policy, 52 IND. L.J. 433, 443 (1977).
28. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936), refer-
ring to the treaty power, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. See also New York Times Co. v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713, 727-29 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring); United States v. Pink,
315 U.S. 203, 229-30 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937); T. JEFFER-
SON, Opinion on the Powers of the Senate Respecting Dolomatic Appointments (1790), 16 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 379 (J. Boyd ed. 1961). Indeed, Justice Sutherland spoke
only of the President as the "sole organ" of the national government "in the field of interna-
tional relations" (United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., supra, at 320) (emphasis
added), arguably a field narrower than that of "foreign affairs," and confined primarily to
the international aspects of foreign relations, a situation not at issue in the Curtiss-Wright
case. See War Powers Legislation: Hearings on S. 731, SJ Res. 18 and S..J Res. 59 Before
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 555 (1971) (statement of
Professor Bickel), and see generally L. HENKIN, supra note 14, at 45-48, 92-94.
29. For the powers of Congress and the President, see L. HENKIN, supra note 14, at 45-
50, 56-65, 74-76. See also Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 604, 616, 706 (D.C. Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976) (President's powers as commander-in-chief, and over for-
eign affairs, give authority to protect the United States from foreign aggression and subver-
sion); United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 603 (3d Cir.), cert. deniedsub nom. Ivanov v.
United States, 419 U.S. 881 (1974) (executive power over foreign affairs supports surveil-
lance to prevent transmission of defense information to foreign governments).
30. See Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 620 n.69 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 944 (1976). In the case which came closest thereto, executive subjection to Congress
was reaffirmed in strident terms. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579 (1952), which was not treated as involving the "foreign affairs" power. See id at 636 n.2
(Jackson, J., concurring).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
32. See, e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229-30 (1942); United States v. Bel-
mont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937); Goldwater v. Carter, 48 U.S.L.W. 2388 (D.C. Cir.), vacated
and remandedfor dismissal, 48 U.S.L.W. 3402 (1979); L. HENKIN, supra note 14, at 47-48.
33. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 727-29 (1971);
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of which rely upon authority conferred, at least impliedly, by the Con-
stitution.34 Above all, the Court has recognized that the historical rea-
sons for an extra-constitutional foreign affairs power are wholly
inapplicable in the domestic sphere;35 there, it has frequently been said,
the government's powers are limited to those granted by the Constitu-
tion, expressly or by implication.36
If, as is argued herein,37 the powers conferred on the President by
the Constitution, either in express terms or by reasonable implication,
are insufficient to support an authority of the breadth claimed by some
Presidents and their apologists, the only possible source of such power
is a notional extra-constitutional grant by the people. Yet, despite a
prolific literature on executive power, the notion of extra-constitutional
power has rarely been subjected to close analysis.3 8 This paper exam-
ines the concept of extra-constitutional presidential power in domestic
affairs, discusses problems raised by it and considers whether such a
concept should be recognized by the law.
I. "Extra-Constitutional," "Implied" and "Inherent" Powers
Proponents of extra-constitutional executive power usually derive
support for their thesis from John Locke who, holding the purpose of
government to be "the preservation of all,"39 asserted that the executive
could, when necessary for the fulfillment of this purpose, act contrary
to law.4" In fact, the general situations Locke cited to illustrate this
Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 604 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
See also R. Longaker, supra note 4, at 139, 153, 161, 164-65 n.30, 168.
34. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cls. I and 2, § 3. See also authorities cited in note 14
supra.
35. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315-16 (1936).
Definition of the ambit of the "foreign affairs" power is neither warranted nor possible in a
paper, such as this, examining executive power in domestic affairs in general terms. But,
clearly, the foreign affairs power must be limited to matters which have a realistic and proxi-
mate connection with relations between the United States and the international community.
See generally L. HENKIN, supra note 14, at 76.
36. See Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 257 (1967); Expare Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 25
(1942). Justice Black has observed that "[t]he United States is entirely a creature of the
Constitution. Its power and authority have no other source. It can only act in accordance
with all the limitations imposed by the Constitution." Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957).
37. See Part II, section B infira.
38. One exception, though not a legal analysis, is Professor Arthur Schlesinger's excel-
lent THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973).
39. J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 76, 82 (3d ed. J. Gough ed.
1966).
40. Id. at 81-82, 84.
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proposition were not cases where the ruler acted contrary to law,4' and
he made it clear that the government may act contrary to law only in
exceptional circumstances, when necessary for the presentation of soci-
ety.42 Locke, presumably, derived this "prerogative '43 power of the ex-
ecutive from an implied term in the compact whereby the individuals
living in a state of nature agreed with one another to join together to
form a civil society.' Whether this reasoning can be applied to the
United States Constitution45 is considered later in this article; yet one
suspects that Locke is quoted by advocates of extra-constitutional
power not so much because of the influence of his ideas on the found-
ing fathers-great though it was46-- but rather because it is useful to
have the support of a "civil libertarian," as Locke is usually regarded,47
when advocating broad executive powers. Weightier support for an ex-
ecutive power to disregard the ordinary law in an emergency might be
derived from the prerogatives of the English Crown.41 Clearly, how-
ever, it would be impolitic to do so. Moreover, the royal prerogative is,
usually (and wisely) considered irrelevant in fixing the ambit of presi-
dential power.49
Despite its theoretical incongruity in a polity with a written, popu-
larly-based constitution" (such as the United States), the doctrine of
extra-constitutional power has historical roots in the process whereby
41. He advocated flexibility in law enforcement, and would allow the ruler to act
"where the law was silent" id. at 82, 84. But see note 42 infra.
42. "[P]rerogative can be nothing but the peopile' permitting their rulers to do several
things of their own free choice where the law was silent, and sometimes, too, against the
direct letter of the law, for the public good, and their acquiescing in it when so done ... "
Id. at 83-84. (emphasis added). Locke generally emphasized executive compliance with
law. Referring to the executive, he wrote: "[Allegiance being nothing but an obedience
according to law, which when he violates, he has no right to obedience, nor can claim it
otherwise than as the public person vested with the power of the law...; and thus he has no
will, no power, but that of the law. But when he quits the representation... he degrades
himself, and is but a single private person without power...." Id. at 76.
43. See id at 82.
44. See id at 49.
45. See text accompanying notes 260-70 infra.
46. See Gough, supra note 39 at xxxvi-xxxvii; B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORiGINs
OF THE AMERICAN REvoLuTIoN 27-30 (1967); G. WooD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, 282-92, 601-02 (Norton Books 1972).
47. See generally Gough, supra note 39, at xxii-xl.
48. See, e.g., Burmah Oil Co. Ltd. v. Lord Advocate, [1965] A.C. 75 (H.L. 1964). Vis-
count Radcliffe, dissenting, quoted with approval Locke's comments on prerogative. Id at
117-18.
49. See R. BERGER, supra note 14, at 49-50 n.5, 51-52, 56; Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9
How.) 603, 618 (1850).
50. See note 252 infra.
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the United States was created." Unlike later British colonies, the
United States became an independent nation not by virtue of any ac-
tion in accordance with the existing legal order, but by overthrowing
the current constitution by an act of revolution52 committed "in the
Name and by Authority" of the people of the American colonies. 3
One cannot avoid skepticism in considering the finality of the declara-
tions of "the People"54 in adopting the new constitution, (apart from
constitutional amendment). In fact, some judges have recognized the
people's "right of revolution."55 As recently as 1972 a Supreme Court
justice regarded the First Amendment as "designed to allow rebellion
to remain as our heritage."56 Moreover, the Ninth and Tenth Amend-
ments are an express constitutional recognition of the existence of po-
tential governmental powers and civil liberties with which federal and
state constitutions do not deal.5 Predictably, constitutional theorists5"
and others5 9 have sought to tap this extra-constitutional reservoir of
power in support of their claims."
51. See B. BAILYN, supra note 46, chs. IV, V; G. WOOD, supra note 46, chs. II, VIII, IX.
See also a comment on the American-Whig theory of the legal justification for mob vio-
lence. Reid, In a Defensive Rage. The Uses of the Mob, the Justiication in Law, and the
Coming of the American Revolution, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1043, 1059, 1061, 1062 (1974).
52. See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 232 (1796); Penhallow v. Doane, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 54, 80 (1795); 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 201 (5th ed. 1891); Morris supra note 23, 82 AM. HIST. REV. at 11-15. Although
the colonists purported to be restoring an ancient British constitution which had, allegedly,
been corrupted by eighteenth century politicians (see B. BAILYN, supra note 46, at ch. IV; G.
WooD, supra note 46, at 32-36), in reality they were in revolution against the extant British
Constitution. As Professor Wood has written: "Yet this continual talk of desiring nothing
new and wishing only to return to the old system and the essentials of the English constitu-
tion was only a superficial gloss. The Americans were rushing into revolution even as they
denied it, their progress both obscured and sustained by a powerful revolutionary ideology
. Id at 13. See generally id at 12-14, 44-45. For a contrary view, see C. MCILWAIN,
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: A CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 15-17, 190-98 (Cornell
ed. 1958).
53. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1776). Arguably, under British law, the United
States remained a colony until 1964. See Statute Law Revision Act 1964 (c.79) § I, repeal-
ing the American Colonies Act 1766 (6 Geo. 3, c.12). But see 22 Geo. 3, c.46 (1782).
54. See U.S. CONST. preamble.
55. See Koeher v. Hill, 60 Iowa 543, 15 N.W. 609, 612, 615 (1883); Wood's Appeal, 75
Pa. 59, 66 (1874) (the judgment of Stowe, J., was questioned generally on appeal. Id at 69);
Wells v. Bain, 75 Pa. 39, 47-48 (1873). See also James Madison, Helvidius letter No. III
(1793), quoted note 259 infra.
56. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 28 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
57. For discussion of the Tenth Amendment, see text accompanying note 256 infra; for
the Ninth Amendment, see note 289 infra.
58. See text accompanying notes 65-71 infra.
59. See, e.g., E. CORWIN, supra note 5, at 494 n.91 (calls in 1932-1933 for a dictator and
suspension of the Constitution).
60. The nature of the British Constitution, in contrast, makes resort to notions of extra-
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Forty years ago, Professor C.H. Mcllwain observed that "[i]n
many ways the non-enumerated powers are more important practically
than the enumerated, for they establish the boundaries of any govern-
ment that can be called legitimate."'" That observation is as apposite
now as it was then, for it should not be doubted that executive author-
ity is not confined to the powers specifically granted by the Constitu-
tion. There are four theoretical categories into which the non-
enumerated powers can be placed.
At one end of the spectrum are powers which, although not con-
ferred expressly by the Constitution, are derived from the express pow-
ers by reasonable implication.62 One cannot question the validity,
indeed necessity, of drawing reasonable implications from the constitu-
tional text in this area, as in all others,63 for the implied authority pro-
vides the means whereby the express powers are carried into
execution.64
At the other end of the spectrum is the doctrine of extra-constitu-
tional powers in its strictest sense. This thesis allows the President
constitutional power unnecessary. The common law can be interpreted judicially to adjust
to the exigencies of the moment. See, e.g., Burmah Oil Co. Ltd. v. Lord Advocate, [1965]
A.C. 75 (H.L. 1964); exparte Marais, [1902] A.C. 109 (P.C. 1901), and Parliament can grant
the executive virtually unlimited powers. See, e.g., Emergency Powers (Defence) Act 1939,
2 & 3 Geo. 6 c.62. Even the "Glorious Revolution" of 1688 was accomplished, from the
legal point of view, by ordinary legislation. See the Crown and Parliament Recognition Act,
1689, 2 W. & M., c. 1; the Bill of Rights, 1688, 1 W. & M. (sess. 2) c.2; the Parliament Act
1688, 1 W. & M., c.1.
61. C. MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE CHANGING WORLD 244-45 (1939).
62. See, e.g., Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 447, 500-01,
514-15, 517-18 (1977); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974); United States v.
United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 310 (1972). We do not necessarily endorse the
Supreme Court's decisions that the executive powers referred to in these cases were implied
in article II of the Constitution.
63. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705-06 n.16 (1974); United States v. Cur-
tiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315-16 (1936).
64. District Judge Pine aptly characterized implied executive powers as "those which
are reasonably appropriate to the exercise of a granted power." Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 103 F. Supp. 569, 573 (D.D.C.), aj7'd, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). Although both
Judge Pine in Sawyer and Chief Justice Burger in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705
n.16 (1974) cited McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,421 (1819), that case is not
wholly appropriate for a description of implied executive power, because Chief Justice Mar-
shall was therein referring to the incidental power of Congress, which is express, not im-
plied. See U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8 cl. 18. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 246-47
(1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in Determining Incidental
Powers of the President and of the Federal Courts: 4 Comment on the Horizontal Effect of
"the Sweeping Clause," 36 OHIO ST. L.. 788, 817 (1975). Professor Van Alstyne argues that
implied executive power is limited to matters "literally indispensable" to performance of
express powers. Id at 794, 797, 823 n.101. We would not draw the line quite so narrowly,
and would imply powers reasonably incidental to those expressly conferred.
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powers derived from outside the Constitution, not by implying them
from within it, and asserts that such powers are recognized by law.65 In
other words, the exercise of these powers, although not constitutional in
origin, is not unlawful in character.66 Such authority is derived, pre-
sumably, from a notional extra-constitutional grant by the people. It
has never been claimed that such extra-constitutional power enables
the President to act independently of Congress, but there is no logical
reason why extra-constitutional power should be so confined. Once the
Constitution ceases to be the criterion of legality, logically there is no
limit to executive power, other than the balance of military force within
the nation.67
Thomas Jefferson was an early exponent of the concept of extra-
constitutional authority; having admitted that the Louisiana purchase
was "an act beyond the Constitution," he hoped Congress would over-
look such "metaphysical subtleties. 68 Some years later he wrote:
A strict observance of the written laws is doubtless one of the
high duties of a good citizen, but it is not the highest. The laws of
necessity, of self-preservation, of saving our country when in
danger, are of higher obligation. To lose our country by a
scrupulous adherence to written law, would be to lose the law
itself, with life, liberty, property and all those who are enjoying
them with us; thus absurdly sacrificing the end to the means.69
The resemblance to Locke7' is obvious; both he and Jefferson were, in
fact, merely restating the ancient maxim saluspopui, suprema lex.7 1
65. See Hurtgen, The Casefor Presidential Prerogative, 7 U. TOL. L. REv. 59, 76, 84
(1975); National Emergency: Hearings Before the Senate Special Committee on the Termina-
tion of the NationalEmergency, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 753 (1973) (testimony of former
Attorney General Elliot Richardson) [hereinafter cited as 1973 Hearings]. Cf. State ex rel.
Mays v. Brown, 71 W. Va. 519, 535, 541, 77 S.E. 243, 250, 252-53 (1912). See also 1973
Hearings pt. I at 22, 319 (testimony of Professor C.P. Cotter).
66. Cf. Clifford and O'Sullivan, [1921] 2 A.C. 570, 589 (H.L. 1921) (Lord Sumner, dis-
senting). The military court, not established under the common law or statute, was "an
extra-legal, I do not say an illegal, institution." Id at 589.
67. See text accompanying note 291 infra.
68. L. HENKIN, supra note 14, at 398 n.79. See also N. SMALL, supra note 3, at 23.
69. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to J.B. Colvin (Sept. 20, 1810), 5 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 542 (H. Washington ed. 1871) (emphasis in original). See also A.
SCHLESINGER, supra note 4, at 24-25, 60. Cf. President Lincoln's Special Session Message to
Congress, July 4, 1861: "[A]re all the laws but one to go unexecuted, and the Government
itself go to pieces lest that one be violated?", 6 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS
1789-1897 25 (J. Richardson ed. 1897) (emphasis in original). See also note 85 infra.
70. See note 40 supra. It has been said that for President Franklin Roosevelt's "concep-
tion of his powers one turns not to the 'stewardship theory,' but the Stuart theory, which is
summed up by John Locke. E. CORwIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS
TODAY 149 (14th ed. 1978).
71. For discussion and application of the maxim, see United States v. Pacific R.R., 120
U.S. 227, 234 (1887); Griffin v. Wilcox, 21 Ind. 370, 379-80 (1863); Johnstone v. O'Sullivan,
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Thirdly, Presidents exercising powers beyond those constitution-
ally granted have, occasionally, asserted that it is proper (because nec-
essary for the preservation of the government or the nation) for the
executive to exercise powers not conferred on it by the Constitution,
although the exercise of such powers is, nonetheless, unconstitutional
and unlawful.7" Proponents of this view concede that officers exercis-
ing such powers may incur civil liability therefor, but suggest that a
grateful legislature will confer immunity (where constitutionally possi-
ble),73 or grant an indemnity,74 ex post facto, if it agrees that the action
taken was necessary in the circumstances. In view of the courts' reluc-
[1923] 2 I.R. 13, 26 (C.A. 1922); R. (Childers) v. Adjutant-General, [1923] 1 I.R. 5, 14 (Ch.D.
1922); Attorney-General v. De Keyser's Royal Hotel Ltd., [1920] A.C. 508, 552 (H.L. 1920);
J. LOCKE, supra note 39, at 80; Hurtgen, supra note 65, at 59-60 n.3; Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to J.B. Colvin, supra note 69, at 544. But see 16 ANNALS OF CONG. 532-33 (1807)
(remarks of Rep. Elliot): "[W]e are told that the saluspopull may have required and may
justify the lex suprema of military despotism. This doctrine is unknown to the Constitution.
That sacred record of our rights proclaims itself and itself alone ... the lex suprema ....
It acknowledges no superior. It contemplates no case in which the law of arms can erect a
throne upon its ruins." See also Gratwick v. Johnson, 70 C.L.R. 1, 11-12, 20 (1945); 16 THE
PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND 284-86, 291, 313 (1766).
72. See former Justice Curtis, Executive Power, (1862) in 2 A MEMOIR OF BENJAMIN
ROBBINS CURTIS, LL.D. 313-14 (B. Curtis ed. 1879); Remarks of Acting Secretary of War
Alexander Dallas, quoted in Dennison, Martial Law: The Development f a Theory of Emer-
gency Powers, 1776-1861, 18 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 52, 64 (1974); 16 ANNALS OF CONG. 516,
564 (remarks of Rep. Bidwell), 518 (Rep. Early), 526 (Rep. Jackson), 570-71 (Rep. Smilie),
571, 576 (Rep. Randolph), 582-83 (Rep. Elmer) (1807); 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 516-17 (re-
marks of Rep. White) (Gales ed. 1789). Cf. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 244-
46, 248 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
73. See Pye & Lowell, The Criminal Process During Civil Disorders, 1975 DUKE L.J.
581, 651-53 n.209; University of Colorado Law Revision Center, .4 Comprehensive Study of
the Use of Military Troops in Civil Disorders with Proposalsfor Legislative Reform, 43 U.
COLO. L. REV. 399, 414-16, 445 n.166 (1972).
74. As happened in the case of Andrew Jackson 29 years after he was fined for con-
tempt of court, see R. RANKIN, WHEN CIVIL LAW FAILS 5-25 (1939). See generally Mitchell
v. Clark, 110 U.S. 633, 649 (1884) (Field, J., dissenting) (not on the question of indemnity);
McCall v. McDowell, 15 F. Cas. 1235, 1243-45 (C.C.D. Cal. 1867) (No. 8,673); 16 ANNALS
OF CONG. 518 (1807) (remarks of Rep. Early), 563, 564 (Rep. Bidwell), 566 (Rep. Quincy),
but see 536 (remarks of Rep. Randolph); Wilmerding, The President and the Law, 67 POL.
Sc. Q. 321, 323-29 (1952). For a discussion of the operation of this principle in regard to
federal spending, see L. FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL SPENDING POWER 229-56 (1975); L. WIL-
MERDING, THE SPENDING POWER 3-19 (1943). Mr. Wilmerding concluded: "There are cer-
tain circumstances which constitute a law of necessity and self-preservation and which
render the saluspopuli supreme over the written law. The officer who is called to act upon
this superior ground does indeed risk himself on the justice of the controlling powers of the
Constitution, but his station makes it his duty to incur that risk. As for Congress, when
expenses are incurred without its sanction, it is discretionary with it to approve or disap-
prove the conduct of the officer concerned .... [T]he law of necessity still stands. The
opinion that the executive departments must obey the appropriation laws even though some
marked evil result to the country or some marked advantage be lost, is wrong. The high
officers of the government, and a fortiori the President, have a right, indeed a duty, to do
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
tance to invalidate or even to review executive action during times of
crisis," there may appear to be little practical difference between this
thesis and the theory of extra-constitutional presidential action outlined
above. The latter, however, is not only less honest in denying the un-
lawfulness of the executive act; it also poses a far greater threat to the
continued authority of the Constitution.76 In any case, Presidents will
continue to act on the basis of perceived necessity, without much re-
gard for the niceties of constitutional theory. Whether or not their ac-
tions are strictly legal is unlikely to concern them unduly, as President
Lincoln demonstrated when reporting to Congress in 1861 that meas-
ures taken to crush the rebellion "whether strictly legal or not, were ven-
tured upon under what appeared to be a popular demand and a public
necessity, trusting then, as now, that Congress would readily ratify
them. '77
Finally, some constitutional scholars have argued that the Presi-
dent has certain powers because they are "inherent" or "innate" in the
offices of Chief Executive and Head of State of a nation.7 S It is claimed
that these powers are ascertained by reasonable implication from--or,
better, a filling out of-the first clause of article II of the Constitution.79
That clause, it is said,80 grants the President "[t]he Executive power""1
in general terms, quite unlike the manner in which specific powers are
conferred on Congress in article J.82 The result is that the President has
authority to do all acts "executive" by nature.8"
what they conceive to be indispensably necessary for the public good, provided always that
they submit their action to Congress to sanction the proceeding." Id at 12-19.
75. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 245-46, 248 (1944) (Jackson, J., dis-
senting); Bell, Book Repiew, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 350, 360 (1976); C. ROSSITER, supra note 4,
at 37-38, 92, 126-29; E. CORWIN, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE CONSTITUTION: ESSAYS
170 (R. Loss ed. 1976); 1973 Hearings, supra note 65, at 330 (testimony of C.P. Cotter); G.
SCHUBERT, THE PRESIDENCY IN THE COURTS 188 (1957). See also E. CORWIN, supra note 5,
at 256.
76. See conclusion infra.
77. 6 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 69, at 24 (emphasis
added).
78. See, e.g., R. Longaker, supra note 4, at 161, 168, 173 n.39, 182, 183, 203. See also
text accompanying notes 160-165 infra.
79. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1: "The Executive power shall be vested in a President
of the United States of America."
80. See notes 160, 161 infra.
81. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. I.
82. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
83. A. HAMILTON, Pacificus letter no. 1 (1793), in 15 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAM-
ILTON 39-40, 42 (H. Syrett & J. Cooke eds. 1969); 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 463, 464, 500 (Gales
ed. 1789) (remarks of Rep. Madison). See also 1 W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTI-
TUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES ch. XV (1953).
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According to this thesis, the President may undertake constitution-
ally whatever is necessary for the preservation of the United States and
its government . 4 Abraham Lincoln was one such exponent and practi-
tioner; he believed that "measures, otherwise unconstitutional, might
become lawful, by becoming indispensable to the preservation of the
constitution, through the preservation of the nation."8 5 But it is notable
that President Lincoln, like others who have regarded the opening
words of article II as a grant of power, 6 preferred to rest his case on the
surer foundation of more specific powers, such as the President's duty
to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed,"8 7 and his power as
commander-in-chief of the armed forces.88
Notwithstanding the considerable following that can be mustered
in support of an extra-constitutional presidential power, it is submitted
that the concept is not an acceptable constitutional doctrine. First,
there is no evidence that "the founders" conceived of government exer-
cising powers derived from some source outside the Constitution; the
84. See, e.g., Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Truman, quoted in text accompanying
note I and note 4 supra; 1973 Hearings (testimony of Senator Pell), pt. 1, su ra note 65, at
259. See also President Roosevelt's address to Congress regarding the Emergency Price
Control Act, September 7, 1942, quoted in E. CORWIN, supra note 5, at 250-51. President
Nixon saw his power in even wider terms. He told the Senate Select Committee on Intelli-
gence that "[it is quite obvious that there are certain inherently governmental actions which,
if undertaken by the sovereign in protection of the interest of the nation's security, are lawful
but which, if undertaken by private persons, are not. . . . [Ilt is naive to attempt to catego-
rize activities a President might authorize as legal' or 'illegal' without reference to the cir-
cumstances under which he concludes that the activity is necessary.": N.Y. Times, March
12, 1976, at 14, col. 2 (emphasis added). See also E. CORWIN supra note 70, at 150; A.
SCHLESINGER, supra note 4; at 263-66. But see United States v. Ehrlichman, 376 F. Supp.
29, 33 (D.D.C. 1974). Justice Frankfurter also would allow the President wide powers; for
him the criterion for war-time military action was not necessity but reasonable expediency.
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 225 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See con-
ira, id at 244 (Jackson, J., dissenting). See also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579, 662 (1952) (Clark, J., concurring), 691-92 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting); J. SMITH
& C. COTTER, supra note 12, at 135; Fairman, The President as Commander in Chief 11 J.
POLITICS 145, 167 (1949).
85. Letter from Abraham Lincoln to A.G. Hodges (April 4, 1864), 7 THE COLLECTED
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 281 (R. Basler ed. 1953). With characteristic succinctness,
Lincoln asked: "Was it possible to lose the nation, and yet preserve the constitution?".
86. See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 83, at 40, 42-43; 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 463, 496-97,
500 (Gales ed. 1789) (remarks of Rep. Madison); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 163-64
(1926) (discussed at note 143 infra), all of which rely, to some extent, on the President's duty
to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. Indeed, "inher-
ent" is often used loosely to describe powers derived from any clause of article II, including
implied powers. See, e.g., R. Longaker, supra note 4, at 214-18.
87. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
88. Id art. II, § 2 cl. 1. See E. CORWIN, supra note 5, at 229. See also R. Longaker,
supra note 4, at 143, 155, 161, 163, 172-73.
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idea is not alluded to in the reports of debates at the Constitutional
Convention or in the Federalist Papers.89 Certainly nothing in the
Constitution itself supports it. In fact, a doctrine of extra-constitutional
power runs counter to the implications of the Ninth and Tenth Amend-
ments, for it would mean that the people would be dispossessed of
some of the rights recognized by those amendments.9" Secondly, as
will be seen,91 the doctrine has no acceptable theoretical basis.92 In
substance, therefore, if not in form, the designation of extra-constitu-
tional powers as "lawful" contravenes a fundamental maxim of Anglo-
American law, tracing its roots at least to Bracton,93 that every person,
no matter how high his office, is subject to the law94 (which, obviously,
includes the Constitution).
It must not be thought that there is any novelty in a debate about
"extra-constitutional" executive powers. Only its American setting is
new; the issue is one of the most ancient and fundamental in political
jurisprudence and has exercised the minds of leading political philoso-
phers.95 In England, for example, the debate goes back to medieval
times. By the early fourteenth century the English kingship is seen to
have two aspects: the theocratic and the feudal.96 The difference be-
89. L. HENKIN, supra note 14, at 24.
90. For discussion of the process by which it may be argued (we believe unconvinc-
ingly) that the people may have lost such powers, see Part III infra. Of course, once one is in
the realm of extra-constitutionality, there is no greater reason to treat the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments as "covering the field" of unenumerated (not including implied) powers and
liberties than there is in regarding the rest of the Constitution as definitive of governmental
powers and civil liberties. This point illustrates the danger of the concept of extra-constitu-
tional powers; having entered the realm of unconstitutionality, where does one stop?
91. Part III infra.
92. See exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 30 (1866) (D.D. Field); id at 121 (Davis,
J.); id at 136-37 (Chase, C.J.); Beaver County Building and Loan Association v. Winowich,
323 Pa. 483, 510-11, 187 A. 481, 493 (1936); R. BERGER, supra note 14, at 101 n.211, 108.
93. See 2 BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE 33, 110, 305 (S.
Thorne transl. 1968).
94. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 655 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882); Gouriet v. Union of Post Office
Workers, [1977] Q.B. 729, 761-62, 766 (C.A. 1977) (reversed by H.L. on grounds not directly
affecting these dicta, [1978] A.C. 435 (H.L. 1977)); Burmah Oil Co. Ltd. v. Lord Advocate,
[1965] A.C. 75, 147 (H.L. 1964); Cox, Watergate andthe Constitution o/the United States, 26
U. TORONTO L.J. 125, 133, 134 (1976).
95. See comments by Machiavelli, Rousseau and J.S. Mill, quotedin A. SCHLESINGER,
supra note 4, at 321-22; J. SMITH & C. COTTER, supra note 12, at 6-8; J. LOCKE, supra note
40.
96. W. ULLMANN, PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE AGES
150-92 (4th ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as ULLMANN, GOVERNMENT]; W. ULLMANN, MEDI-
EVAL POLITICAL THOUGHT 145-55 (1975) [hereinafter cited as ULLMANN, POLITICAL
THOUGHT].
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tween them, so far as concerns the subject of this paper, was that the
theocratic king, being the anointed of God,97 was considered not to be
subject to human law,98 whereas the feudal king was.99 Political theo-
rists of the day reconciled the contradictory aspects of English kingship,
as did Locke'00 three centuries later, by holding that the king should
obey the law except when it was necessary for the welfare of the coun-
try that he do otherwise. 01 But the courts were unsure how to rule in
specific cases, emphasizing first the older' 02 theocratic strand'0 3 and,
later, the feudal one.101 In Stuart times the absolutist (or theocratic)
aspect achieved a brief ascendancy in the courts, 05 but the revolution-
ary settlement of 1688-89 established the rule that the Crown is always
97. ULLMANN, GOVERNMENT, supra note 96, at 121-23; ULLMANN, POLITICAL
THOUGHT, supra note 96, at 53-58, 149.
98. ULLMANN, GOVERNMENT, supra note 96, at 173.
99. Id at 152; ULLMANN, POLITICAL THOUGHT, supra note 96, at 147. For the position
in the thirteenth century, see I F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 181-83, 515-18 (2d ed. 1923).
100. See notes 40 and 42 supra.
101. See W. FARR, JOHN WYCLIF AS LEGAL REFORMER, 141, 142, 143-44, 149-50 (1974);
ULLMANN, GOVERNMENT, supra note 96, at 184-85. See also Professor Mcllwain's discov-
ery in Bracton of a distinction between gubernaculum (where the king's authority was abso-
lute) and jurisdictio (where he was bound by law). C. MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM
ANCIENT AND MODERN 76-77, 78-79, 85, 87 (rev. ed. 1947); ULLMANN, GOVERNMENT,
supra note 96, at 177-78. For a criticism of McIlwain's thesis, see Tierney, Bracton on Gov-
ernment, 38 SPECULUM 295, 307-08 (1963). See generally D. HANSON, FROM KINGDOM TO
COMMONWEALTH 97-133 (1970).
102. See ULLMANN, GOVERNMENT, supra note 96, at 117 et seq.; ULLMANN, POLITICAL
THOUGHT, supra note 96, at 130 et seq.
103. See D. HANSON, supra note 101, at 211-13. See also the dialogue between master
and pupil in DIALOGUS DE SCACCARIO (Dialogue of the Exchequer) (probably written by
Richard FitzNeal ca. 1179), THE COURSE OF THE EXCHEQUER 101-02 (C. Johnson transl.
1950), quoted in C. MCILWAIN, supra note 61, at 249-50.
104. See, e.g., Case of Proclamations, 12 Co. Rep. 74, 76, 77 Eng. Rep. 1352, 1354 (K.B.
1611); Case of Monopolies, 11 Co. Rep. 84b, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B. 1602); Cavendish's
Case, I And. 152, 123 Eng. Rep. 403 (C.P. 1587); Willion v. Berkley, I Plow. 223, 75 Eng.
Rep. 339 (C.P. 1561). See also Prohibitions del Roy, 12 Co. Rep. 63, 65, 77 Eng. Rep. 1342,
1343 (1608).
105. See, e.g., Bate's Case (the Case of Impositions), 2 St. Tr. 371, 389 (Ex. 1606); R. v.
Hampden (The Ship Money Case), 3 St. Tr. 825 (1637). Berkeley, J., said: "I never read nor
heard, that lex was rex; but it is common and most true, that rex is lex, for he is 'lex loquens,'
a living, a speaking, an acting law." Id at 1098. Similarly, Vernon, J.,: "[A] statute dero-
gating from the prerogative doth not bind the king; and the king may dispense with any law
in cases of necessity .. " Id at 1125. Accord, id at 1235 (Finch, C.J.); Godden v. Hales,
11 St. Tr. 1165 (1686). See generally F. WORMUTH, THE ROYAL PREROGATIVE 1603-1649
(1939); T. PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 49-51 (5th ed. 1956) (a
perceptive comment). But these views did not prevail long. Parliament reversed the deci-
sion in the Ship Money Case (Abolition of Ship Money Act 1640 (16 Car. I, c.14)), and
impeached six of the judges involved in it, 3 St. Tr. 1260 (1641); Bate's Case, supra, had
already been reversed by the Petition of Right 1628 (3 Car. I, c.1).
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subject to the law. 10 6
However, the victory of "feudal" kingship was not complete, for
the fact that the royal prerogative, which originally defined the sphere
left to theocratic kingship,0 7 remains part of the common law allows
traces of theocratic kingship to remain without detracting from the rule
that the Crown can never act contrary to law. Thus, although the royal
prerogative allows the Crown to contravene the usual rules of common
law in certain emergency situations, 08 the executive, when so acting, is
still complying with the law, because "the law" includes the preroga-
tive.'09 All this, of course, is consistent with the fundamental rule of
the British Constitution, the supremacy of Parliament, because Parlia-
ment can amend or abolish the royal prerogative at any time,"10 and
the Crown may never contravene an Act of Parliament."' Unfortu-
nately for American Presidents, the presence of a written constitution
with the status of "supreme law"" 12 tends somewhat to curtail their the-
ocratic tendencies and aspirations.
II. Constitutional Executive Power
A detailed consideration of the constitutional powers of the Presi-
dent is beyond the scope of this paper. Rather the discussion will be
confined to those aspects of the powers which serve to explain why con-
cepts of "extra-constitutional" presidential power have developed, for,
if an asserted executive power was neither delegated by Congress nor
conferred by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, logically
106. See Gouriet v. Union of Post Office Workers, [1977] Q.B. 729, 761 (C.A. 1977),
reversed by H.L. on grounds not affecting this dictum, [1978] A.C. 435 (H.L. 1977); Burmah
Oil Co. Ltd. v. Lord Advocate, [1965] A.C. 75, 147 (H.L. 1964); Fitzgerald v. Muldoon,
[1976] 2 N.Z.L.R. 615. See also Bankers' Case, 14 St. Tr. 1 (Ex. Ch. 1690-1700); Pawlett v.
Attorney-General, Hardres 465, 469, 145 Eng. Rep. 550, 552 (Ex. 1668); J. MITCHELL, CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW 174 (2d ed. 1968). Lord President Bradshawe quoted Bracton to King
Charles I at his trial in 1649. 4 St. Tr. 1009.
107. See ULLMANN, GOVERNMENT, supra note 96, at 184-85.
108. See Burmah Oil Co. Ltd. v. Lord Advocate, [1965] A.C. 75 (H.L. 1964); Attorney
General v. De Keyser's Royal Hotel Ltd., [1920] A.C. 508, 565 (H.L. 1920); Commonwealth
v. Colonial Combing, Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd., 31 C.L.R. 421, 442 (1922).
109. See Laker Airways Ltd. v. Department of Trade, [1977] Q.B. 643, 704-06 (C.A.
1976). Cf. N. MACHIAVELLI, THE DISCOURSES 194 (B. Crick ed. 1970).
110. Laker Airways Ltd. v. Department of Trade, [1977] Q.B. 643, 707, 718-22, 727-28
(C.A. 1976); Barton v. Commonwealth, 131 C.L.R. 477 (1974); Egan v. Macready, [1921] 1
I.R. 265 (Ch. D. 1921); Attorney General v. De Keyser's Royal Hotel Ltd., [1920] A.C. 508
(H.L. 1920).
111. See note 106 supra. See also Province of Bombay v. Municipal Corp. of Bombay,
[1947] A.C. 58 (P.C. 1946).
112. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
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its only possible source is some extra-constitutional authority. Only
those powers conferred on the President by the Constitution itself will
be considered, although these are of less practical importance than the
extensive powers delegated to him by Congress." 3 But, before examin-
ing executive powers, it is appropriate to consider their relationship to
congressional power.
A. Legislative-Executive Overlap
Had the United States Constitution been regarded as embodying a
very rigid conception of the separation of powers doctrine there might
have been no problem of overlap of the powers of Congress and the
President, 4 except, perhaps, when presidential power derived by rea-
sonable implication from express powers coincided with an exercise of
congressional power under the "necessary and proper" clause. 115 Even
that problem of concurrent power could have been avoided by inter-
preting the "necessary and proper" clause restrictively, for example by
limiting it to matters in which a law is necessary to implement an exec-
utive power 16 or by denying the validity of implying executive pow-
ers. 117  Although traces of an uncomplicated, strict separation of
powers doctrine appear occasionally,1"" the presently accepted concep-
113. See J. SMITH & C. COTTER, supra note 12, at 2; Black, The Presidency and Congress,
32 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 841, 849-50 (1975); SENATE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE TERMI-
NATION OF THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY, EMERGENCY POWERS STATUTES, S. REP. No. 549,
93d Cong., 1st Sess., iii andpassim (1973). But see National Emergencies Act, Pub. L. No.
94-412, 90 Stat. 1255 (1976). Delegation of power to the President need not be express. It
can be inferred from appropriation of funds, see G. SCHUBERT, supra note 75, at 291, or
from prolonged congressional silence (implying acquiescence) in the face of executive initia-
tive, see id; L. HENKIN, supra note 14, at 105, 299 n.17; Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952); United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915).
It is wise to interpret the ambit of express and reasonably implied presidential powers in the
light of current constitutional developments, and not according to some fixed conception of
what the founding fathers intended 200 years ago. But one must be wary of inferring con-
gressional acquiescence from insufficient evidence, especially if Congress might thereby be
estopped from reversing its earlier decision. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 152
(1926). See generally R. BERGER, supra note 14, at 88-100. The Supreme Court has refused
to infer congressional consent from silence in response to presidential action followed by a
challenge to Congress to reverse it. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579
(1952).
114. See E. CORWIN, supra note 5, at 122; L. HENKIN, supra note 14, at 341 n.11.
115. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 clause 18.
116. See Van Alstyne, supra note 64, at 823 n.101, interpretation 5.
117. See Calhoun, quotedin Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 181, 246 n.7 (1926); In
re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 83 (1890) (Lamar, J., dissenting).
118. See, e.g., Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 508-14 (1977)
(Burger, C.J. dissenting) (but see opinion of the Court at 441-44); Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587, 589 (1952) (per Black J.) (but see id at 589 Frankfurter, J.,
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tion of the doctrine is a much more realistic one, recognizing the inter-
dependence between the legislature and the executive."l 9 In what may
be seen as the "substantive" counterpart of the device of "checks and
balances,"12 it is now recognized that Congress and the President have
concurrent authority (not necessarily co-extensive) in many areas of
national concern, and that complete regulation of them, or intelligent
action in them, is possible-at least in practice-only through coopera-
tion between both branches,' 2 ' with their efforts complementing, rather
than cancelling, one another.'22 However, in such fields of concurrent
legislative and executive authority, inconsistent exercises of power will
occur, and these raise the question of the relative supremacy of the two
branches.
It probably was not inevitable that the executive should be seen to
concurring); Springer v. Gov't. of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189. 201-02 (1928) (butsee
Holmes, J., dissenting, joined by Brandeis, J., id at 211). Cf. James Madison, Helvidius
letter no. 11 (1793), 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 155-56 (G. Hunt ed. 1906).
119. See Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 435,441-44 (1977); Buck-
ley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121-22 (1976); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974);
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 291 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Cotter, supra note
65, at 335; Bruff, Presidential Power andAdministrative Rulemaking, 88 YALE L.J. 451, 470-
71, 487 (1979). In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952),
Justice Jackson, concurring, recognized a "zone of twilight" where the powers of the Presi-
dent and Congress are concurrent. Accord, id at 597, 690. See also Alexander Hamilton,
Pacificus letter no. I, supra note 83, at 40, 42; C. THACH, THE CREATION OF THE PRESI-
DENCY 1775-1789 169-70 (1922). For a historical discussion of this "zone of twilight," see
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 566-67 (L. Jayson & J. Killiam eds. 1973).
120. See THE FEDERALIST, No. 47 at 302-03, No. 48 at 308, No. 51 at 322 (Madison), No.
66 at 401-02 (Hamilton) (Mentor Books 1961); Sparkman, Checks and Balances in American
Foreign Policy, 52 IND. L. J. 433, 439, 447 (1977); Comment, United Sates v. AT& T. Judi-
cially Supervised Negotiation and Political Questions, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 466, 474 n.42, 475
n.44, 477 (1977). See also Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028, 1067 (Ct. Cl. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978). See generally M. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPA-
RATION OF POWERS 147-75 (1967).
121. An example is the War Powers Resolution, 87 Stat. 555 (1973). See also United
States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 551 F.2d 384, 392 (D.C. Cir. 1976), continuation in 567 F.2d
121, 127-28, 130 (D.C. Cir. 1977); L. HENKIN, supra note 14, at 108-10, 276; 1973 Hearings,
supra note 65, pt. 2, at 520 (remarks of former Justice Clark and former Attorney General
Katzenbach).
122. But this must not be taken too far. As Justice Brandeis wrote: "The doctrine of the
separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787, not to promote efficiency but
to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was, not to avoid friction, but, by
means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the governmental powers
among three departments, to save the people from autocracy." Myers v. United States, 272
U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Accord H. TRUMAN, TRUMAN SPEAKS 8
(1960). The separation of powers doctrine may have been an application of the laissez-faire
philosophy that "that government is best which governs least." See L evitan, The Responsi-
bility of Administrative Officials in a Democratic Society, 61 POL. Sc. Q. 562, 563 (1946).
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occupy any field inviolate from congressional interference. Although
responsible government on the British model was constitutionally ex-
cluded, 123 had Washington, Hamilton and the first Congress desired it,
the President could possibly have become a mere figure-head, with ac-
tual power vested in the hands of ministers politically responsible to,
but not members of,24 the legislature. 2 The United States would
then have had a system of congressional government. In such a system,
Congress would exercise all political power and could effectually legis-
late on all matters of national concern, provided it could override a
presidential veto' 26 (which would probably not have been difficult in
the circumstances). The country vaguely approached this position in
1867, 127 and indeed in 1885 Woodrow Wilson described the national
political system as one of "congressional government."'I2 If the de
facto supremacy of Congress had been maintained into this century,
the "gloss which life [had] written"'29 on the separation of powers doc-
trine might well have resulted in the Supreme Court ruling that no field
of executive power was independent of congressional control.13 0 But
123. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2: "[N]o person holding any office under the United
States shall be a member of either House during his continuance in office." But see E.
CORWIN, supra note 70, at 164, and EssAYs, supra note 75, at 172.
124. See note 123 supra.
125. See E. CORWIN, supra note 5, at 17, 371 n.45; M. CUNLIFFE, supra note 4, at 55. See
also C. THACH, supra note 119, at 157. For Professor Corwin's interesting proposals for
strengthening the Cabinet, see E. CORWIN, supra note 5, at 297-98, 489 n.87, and ESSAYS,
supra note 75, at 171-72.
126. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cls. 2 and 3.
127. In that year Congress purported to confer on General Grant some of President
Johnson's powers as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and passed the Tenure of
Office Act purporting to restrict the President's power of dismissing members of his cabinet.
See L. HENKIN, supra note 14, at 350 n.42; A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 4, at 71-72.
128. W. WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT (1885).
129. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring).
130. Cf. L. HENKIN, supra note 14, at 106. The Australian Constitution makes an inter-
esting comparison because, although it confers on the executive many powers similar to
those of the President, (AuSTL. CONST. §§ 51 (xxxix), 61, 64, 67, 72(i), 68; cf U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 18, art. II, § 1, cl. 1, art. II, § 2, cl. 2, art. II, § 2, cl. 1) it seems that Parliament
can control the executive in all matters. See Victoria v. Commonwealth, 134 C.L.R. 338,
362, 379, 406 (1975). Contra, Richardson, The Executive Power ofthe Commonwealth, in
COMMENTARIES ON THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION 50, 66 n.43, 67 n.45, 72, 82, 85 (L.
Zines ed. 1977); Sawer, The Governor-General ofthe Commonwealth of Australia, 52 CUR-
RENT AFF. BULL. (Univ. of Sydney), No. 10, 20, at 25 (March 1976). This is held to be so
because the British principle of responsible government operates in Australia. (see Victorian
Stevedoring & General Contracting Co. Pty. Ltd. v. Dignan, 46 C.L.R. 73, 114 (1931); Com-
monwealth v. Colonial Combing, Spinning & Weaving Co. Ltd., 31 C.L.R. 421, 446 (1922);
Amalgamated Society of Engineers v. Adelaide Steamship Co. Ltd., 28 C.L.R. 129, 146-47
(1920)), even though it is only implied in the Constitution. See AUSTL. CONST. §§ 56, 62, 64.
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the ever-fluctuating balance of power between the two branches
changed soon after Wilson wrote his description.13" Indeed, just before
the 1973 Watergate affair 131 the balance was almost the exact opposite
of what Woodrow Wilson had described in 1885.133
The strict legal position alone does not, by any means, determine
the political balance of power between the President and Congress, but
it continues to have an important impact on the nation's political
life. 134 Judicial resolution of conflicting claims of power by Congress
and the President has not been simple 135 and has seemed at times to be
undertaken on an ad hoc basis, without resort to any fundamental prin-
ciple.' 36 Nonetheless, it is helpful to distinguish two kinds of legisla-
tive/executive conflicts-those involving matters of "substance,"' 137 and
other conflicts, usually involving the "machinery of government."' 138
(Contrast U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.) See also Ansett Transport Industries (Operations)
Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth, 139 C.R. 54, 87 (1977); New South Wales v. Commonwealth,
135 C.L.R. 337, 364-365 (1975).
131. See Wilson, Preface to the fifteenth edition of CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT xi-
xiii (1900).
132. For a discussion, see A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 4, at 266-77.
133. See A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 4passim, and Epilogue, 454 (Popular Library ed.
1974). For some of the reasons why the President grew so powerful, see Cox, supra note 94,
at 125-27. As early as 1948, Professor Corwin-by no means niggardly in regard to his
interpretation of executive power-had characterized the position of the Presidency as one
of "unhealthy dominance in the system, one which instead of expediting the formation of
national policy often stands in the way of it." E. CORWIN, ESSAYS, supra note 75, at 176.
134. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121-35 (1976).
135. See, e.g, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349
(1958); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), Humphrey's Execu-
tor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926); Little v.
Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804); United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 551 F.2d 384
(D.C. Cir. 1976), continuation in 567 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Senate Select Committee on
Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Cf. Nixon v.
Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977); Springer v. Government of the Phil-
ippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189 (1928).
136. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 128-37 (1976). See also Henkin, Constitu-
tional Fathers-Constitutional Sons, 60 MINN. L. REV. 1113, 1119 n. 14 (1976); Comment,
supra note 120, at 477: "Every situation involving competing functions of two branches
must be considered independently to see whether separateness or interdependence would
best accommodate the interest of a workable yet balanced government;" Bruff, supra note
119, at 479, 488, 495-99.
137. Such conflicts involve a confrontation between an asserted executive power to act in
an area and a congressional claim to regulate that area. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1 (1976); Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935);
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926); Little v. Barreme 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
138. See, e.g., Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977); United
States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 551 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir. 1976), continuation in 567 F.2d 121
(D.C. Cir. 1977); Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon,
498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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It is submitted that, on matters of "substance," the area of execu-
tive inviolability from congressional control 139 comprises the expressly
enumerated executive powers' 4° and, possibly,14 1 any implied executive
powers 142 which fall outside the ambit of congressional power, includ-
ing the "necessary and proper" clause. 143 Statutes which seek to im-
139. "Congressional control" is probably not confined to the enactment of legislation; a
Concurrent Resolution or a successfully vetoed Bill or Joint Resolution may suffice to con-
fine the exercise of executive power. See Black, supra note 113, at 852; Watson, Congress
Steps Out: A Look at Congressional Control of the Executive, 63 CALIF. L. REv. 983, 1085-86
(1975). Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (Frankfurter,
Burton, Jackson and Clark, JJ., concurring).
140. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 124-36 (1976); United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936); Congress, the President, and the War Powers: Hear-
ings Before the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 33, 36, 49 (statement of Professor
Mallison), 47, 79 (Professor Bickel), 216 (Assistant Attorney General Rehnquist), 226, 228
(Mr. Stevenson) (1970); 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 463, 464, 582 (Gales ed. 1789) (remarks of Rep.
Madison). See also Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 500 (1977)
(Powell, J., concurring) 509, 510, 514-16, 525 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) 558-61 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
Five justices in the Steel Seizure case acknowledged that there are executive powers
beyond congressional control, but none of them was prepared to specify these powers. See
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 597, 637, 690 (1952). See also
Kendall v. United States ex rel Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 610 (1838); United States v.
Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147 (1871). It would be unconstitutional for Congress to deny
the President funds needed to execute his express powers, for that would enable Congress
effectually to negate the express intention of the Constitution. See opinions quoted in E.
CORWIN, supra note 5, at 401 (Rep. Bayard), 402 (Daniel Webster, President Buchanan), 403
(Senator Root), 403-04 (Senator Borah). See also L. HENKIN, supra note 14, at 79, 108-10,
113-15, 161-62; Congress, the President, and the War Powers, supra at 225 (Mr. Stevenson);
King & Leavens, Curbing the Dog of War: The War Powers Resolution, 18 HARV. INT'L. L.
J. 55, 88 n.152, 89 (1977). But see Franck, After the Fall- The New Procedural Frameworkfor
Congressional Control Over the War Power, 71 AM. J. INT'L. L. 605, 622 n.74, 623 n.80, 633
(1977).
141. But see note 143 infra.
142. As to the ambit of these, see note 64 supra. For a narrower view, see Myers v.
United States, 272 U.S. 52, 246-47 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
143. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 clause 18. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 231
(1926). Presumably, Professor Henkin had in mind a conflict between implied executive
power and legislative power when he asserted that "[e]ven where the President's authority is
clear and perhaps primary, his acts will bow before an act of Congress for purposes of do-
mestic law. . . ." L. HENKIN, supra note 14 at 106 (emphasis added).
Notwithstanding Chief Justice Taft's endorsement of Hamilton's view that art. II, § 1,
cl. 1 of the Constitution confers on the President a "general" executive power, see Myers v.
United States, 272 U.S. 52, 118, 138-39 (1926), Myers v. United States should not be inter-
preted as holding that Congress cannot control the exercise of "inherent" executive powers
(if they exist). Taft stated his conclusion without relying directly on a "general" executive
power derived from art. II, § 1, cl. 1; instead, he based it substantially on the President's
express power of appointment, art. II, § 2, cl. 2, and his duty to "take care that the laws be
faithfully executed," art. II, § 3. 272 U.S. at 117, 135, 163-64. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 135-36 (1976); Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 352 (1958); Atkins v. United
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pinge on this rather narrow area of exclusive executive authority will
be invalid, 44but in all other areas of conflict over matters of substance
Congress will prevail.145 This result is due to the nature of the compet-
ing values. Since the executive lacks an express incidental power, 146 all
cases of inconsistency on matters of substance, except those mentioned,
present a conflict between an express power of Congress and an im-
plied power of the President. 47 In such a contest, it is submitted, the
expressly conferred power ought to prevail.' 48 But the apparent sim-
plicity of these propositions for the resolution of conflicts between Con-
States, 556 F.2d 1028, 1069 n.35 (Ct. Cl. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978); Youngs-
town Sheet & Tube Co.v. Sawyer, 103 F. Supp. 569, 574 (D.D.C.). aft'd, 343 U.S. 579
(1952). Cf. I ANNALS OF CONG. 463, 496-97, 500 (Gales ed. 1789) (remarks of Rep.
Madison). Accordingly, on a careful reading, the Myers case is seen to have brought legisla-
tive power into conflict with an express executive power--the President's duty to "take care
that the laws be faithfully executed." With respect, the opinion of Professors Pye and Low-
ell that the area of executive inviolability from congressional control includes "lesser powers
necessarily included within the express powers" is too broadly stated. Pye & Lowell, supra
note 73, at 628 n.132.
144. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). As
to whether the President may disregard such an "Act," see R. BERGER, wupra note 14, at 307-
09; E. CORWIN, supra note 70, at 156.
145. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). Little v. Barreme, 6
U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 177-78 (1804). In the former case Justice Jackson wrote: "When the
President takes measures incompatible with the express or implied will of Congress, his
power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional power minus
any constitutionalpowers of Congress over the matter." 343 U.S. at 637 (emphasis added).
We would not interpret this dictum as an assertion that Congress can detract from the ex-
press powers of the President. See id at 644; note 140 supra.
On a number of occasions, Presidents have disobeyed the will of Congress. See E.
CORWIN, supra note 5, at 120 (Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Taft), 270 (President
Wilson); Note, Honored in the Breech: Presidential Authority to Execute the Laws with Mili-
tary Force, 83 YALE L.J. 130, 131 (1973) (Presidents Lyndon Johnson and Nixon). President
Franklin Roosevelt threatened to disobey a statutory provision if Congress did not repeal it;
Congress obliged. See E. CORWIN, supra note 5, at 250-5 1.
146. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 588-89 (1952); Myers v.
United States, 272 U.S. 52, 246 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); War Powers Legislation,
supra note 28, at 551 (statement of Professor Bickel).
147. Hence Congress is under no constitutional duty to appropriate funds needed to ex-
ecute imfplied presidential powers; there the conflict is between an implied executive power
and the express congressional power in art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
148. But cf. Henkin, Infallibility Under Law.- Constitutional Balancing, 78 COLUM. L.
REv. 1022, 1029 n.40, 1035 n.73 (1978). In the event of conflict between the exercise of
implied substantive powers by both the President and Congress (assuming there are implied
legislative powers beyond the ambit of the "necessary and proper" clause), Congress should
prevail. See note 145 supra. This accords with the Founding Fathers' intention to give the
legislature primacy. See R. BERGER, supra note 14, at 50, 52; L. HENKIN, supra note 14, at
33. See also Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 183-84 (1926) (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
It is submitted that the separation of powers doctrine, if not the interpretation of the consti-
tutional text itself, will ensure that inconsistency between the exercise of express legislative
power (other than the spending power) and express executive power does not arise.
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gress and the President on matters of substance is deceptive, for there is
much scope for disagreement as to what executive authority is con-
ferred by the express grants in the Constitution 149 and what powers are
implied. 150
As yet, there has been little judicial formulation of standards for
resolving legislative/executive conflict involving the "machinery of
government." Indeed, in the most recent controversy of this kind, the
court sought resolution by negotiation between the two branches,
rather than by judicial fiat.'15 Conflicts over the "machinery of govern-
ment" usually involve implied powers on both sides, in which case
courts have to weigh the competing interests of the two branches 15 2 to
the best of their ability.'53 It is submitted that, in weighing or balanc-
ing these interests, the judiciary must base its reasoning on two funda-
mental axioms of the American political system: first, preservation of
the integrity and efficacy of all branches of government, including the
executive, and secondly, the general primacy of Congress. 154 Recently,
the Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Brennan, 155 enunciated
the general criteria for resolving such conflicts:
[I]n determining whether the Act disrupts the proper balance be-
tween the coordinate branches, the proper inquiry focuses on the
extent to which it prevents the Executive Branch from accom-
plishing its constitutionally assigned functions. Only where the
potential for disruption is present must we then determine
whether that impact is justified by an overriding need to promote
objectives within the constitutional authority of Congress.' 5 6
149. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 124-33 (1976).
150. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705-06, 708, 711 (1974); Van Alstyne,
supra note 64, at 809-17.
151. See United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 551 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir. 1976), continua-
tion in 567 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1977). For a favorable review, see Comment, upra note 120,
at 489-94.
152. See Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977); United States v. Am.
Tel. & Tel. Co., 551 F.2d 384, 391-94 (D.C. Cir. 1976), continuation in 567 F.2d 121, 131-33
(D.C. Cir. 1977); Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498
F.2d 725, 731-33 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 1083, 711-13 (1974).
But see contra, Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. at 547, 558-59 (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting).
153. As to the courts' difficulty in performing this task, see Comment, Supra note 120, at
480-83; United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 551 F.2d 384, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1976). See also
United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 567 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
154. See note 148 supra.
155. Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977) (Brennan, J., for the majority,
joined by Stewart, White, Marshall and Stevens, JJ.).
156. Id at 443 (citations omitted). Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, rejected what he called
the Court's "novel 'balancing test;"' for Justice Rehnquist it was a "fundamental proposi-
tion" that "any substantial intrusion upon the effective discharge of the duties of the Presi-
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This reasoning would plainly seem to implicate both of the relevant
interests, the general presumption being that in such instances congres-
sional interests are paramount.
B. Principal Express Powers
1. The "Executive Power" Clause
The Constitution adopted a rather simple format for creating and
defining the powers of the new federal polity, one clearly demonstrat-
ing the founding fathers' adherence to the notion of the separation of
powers. Article I dealt with the legislative power, article II with the
executive power and article III with the judicial power. The first clause
of each article created the organ of government which was to exercise
the power. Thus, article I created a Congress, article II a President and
article III a Supreme Court.
The first clause of article II provides that "[tihe Executive Power
shall be vested in a President of the United States of America,"' 57
whereas the equivalent section in article I states: "All legislative
powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United
States. . . ."I" The absence of the phrase "herein granted," or its
equivalent, in article II (and article I11' ' ) has been the cause of debate
for many years. One side argues that the absence of the limiting words
"herein granted" in article II is significant and cannot be overlooked in
interpreting that article.'6 ° In addition to the specific powers conferred
dent is sufficient to violate the principle of separation of powers, and our prior cases do not
permit the sustaining of an Act such as [the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preserva-
tion Act of 1974] by 'balancing' an intrusion of substantial magnitude against the interests
allegedly fostered by the Act." Id at 546, 547, 559. Chief Justice Burger, dissenting,
adopted a criterion even less favorable to Congress: the Act was invalid for violating the
separation of powers principle "because it exercises a coercive influence by another Branch
over the Presidency." Id at 514.
157. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
158. Id art. L § 1 (emphasis added).
159. See id art. III, § 1. For the significance of the absence of such words in article III,
see Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 81-82 (1907).
160. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 128 (1926) (Taft, C.J.); note 12 and accom-
panying text supra. The classic exposition of this view-the so-called "inherent power" doc-
trine, see text accompanying notes 78 and 79 supra,-is Alexander Hamilton's in his first
Pacificus letter: "It would not consist with the rules of sound construction to consider this
enumeration of particular authority [in article II] as derogating from the more comprehen-
sive grant contained in the general clause, further than as it may be coupled with express
restrictions or qualifications;. . . the difficulty of a complete and perfect specification of all
the cases of Executive authority would naturally dictate the use of general terms-and
would render it improbable that a specification of certain particulars was designd [sic] as a
substitute for those terms, when antecedently used. The different mode of expresssion em-
ployed in the constitution in regard to the two powers the legislative and the Executive
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by sections 2 and 3 of article II, it is said, section 1 expressly confers on
the President "the executive power."' 16' This power, it is asserted, must
at least enable him to do whatever is necessary to preserve the United
States and its constitution.' 62 But, once it is alleged that the concept
"executive power" has some inherent content, there is no reason to
limit it to presidential action taken when the nation is in extremis. A
more sensible interpretation would be that the President may do any-
thing not forbidden by the Constitution (presumably forbidden by be-
ing expressly confided to another branch of government or prohibited
by the Constitution). 163 This was, in fact, the opinion of Presidents
serves to confirm this inference .... The enumeration ought rather therefore to be consid-
ered as intended by way of greater caution, to specify and regulate the principal articles
implied in the definition of Executive Power, leaving the rest to flow from the general grant
of that power, interpreted in conformity to other parts [of] the constitution and to the princi-
ples of free government." Hamilton, supra note 83, at 39, quotedin Myers v. United States,
272 U.S. at 138. But see THE FEDERALIST, No. 77, at 463 (Mentor Books 1961) (A. Hamil-
ton). It should also be borne in mind, first, that, as Hamilton himself admitted, his opinion
was based on grounds wider than necessary; he argued that the duty to "take care that the
laws be faithfully executed" "might alone have been relied upon." See Hamilton, supra
note 83, at 42-43. Secondly, the executive action (the Proclamation of Neutrality) concerned
foreign relations, where the President's authority is concededly wider than in domestic af-
fairs. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319, 320 (1936).
Although Madison, as Helvidius, replied to Hamilton's defense of Washington's Procla-
mation, he failed to address the issue whether the first clause of article II was itself a grant of
power, on the constitutional question, he contented himself with "denying that the powers to
make war and peace were executive in nature." C. ROSSITER, ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND
THE CONSTITUTION 327 n.106 (1964). There are passages in Madison's reply which assume
that the first clause of article II grants power (see Helvidius letter no. I, supra note 118, at
143, 146, 149, 153), and that there are powers "executive" in nature (id, at 146-47), a view he
had taken four years earlier in the House of Representatives. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 463,
464, 496, 500 (Gales ed. 1789). But, as in the earlier debate (see id. at 463, 496-97, 500), and
Chief Justice Taft's opinion in Myers (see note 143 supra), the emphasis was always on the
President's express obligation to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed." See
Helvidius letter no. I, supra note 118 at 145, 149, 152 ("To see the laws faithfully executed
constitutes the essence of the executive authority."). Moreover, when he listed the executive
powers conferred by the Constitution, Madison significantly omitted the first clause of arti-
cle II (see id. at 148-50); he also began his second letter with a strong attack on "constructive
prerogative" and, it seems, the "inherent power" thesis. Id. at 152.
161. See Hamilton quo/edin note 160 supra; 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 382 (remarks of Rep.
Clymer), 463, 496 (Rep. Madison) (Gales ed. 1789). See also C. THACH, supra note 119, at
151-45.
162. See note 84 supra; Assistant Attorney General Baldridge in argument before the
District Court in the Steel Seizure case, quotedin J. SMITH & C. COTTER, supra note 12, at
174 n.10 (the argument was rejected: Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 103 F.
Supp. 569, 573-74 (D.D.C.), af§'d, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)). See also Duncan v. Kahanamoku,
327 U.S. 304, 345-46 (1946) (Burton, J., dissenting); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Saw-
yer, 343 U.S. 579, 662 (1952).
163. See Hamilton, Pacificus letter no. I, supra note 83, at 39, 40. Myers v. United States,
272 U.S. 52 (1926) does not adopt an interpretation of art. II, § I, cl. 1 as broad as that stated
here. See note 143 supra.
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Theodore Roosevelt' 64 and Harry Truman. 165
The opposing and more persuasive view denies the existence of
"inherent" presidential power 66 and attributes no importance to the
difference in wording between the two articles. 167 This position rests
primarily on two arguments. First, an examination of the format of
article II reveals that the first section deals with procedural matters
such as the eligibility and method of election of the President, while the
second and third sections list his powers and duties. An unbiased read-
ing of article II as a whole suggests that the purpose of its first clause
was merely to create the office of the President who was to exercise the
powers conferred in subsequent sections. The historical evidence con-
firms this interpretation. As Professor Corwin has written: "The
records of the Constitutional Convention make it clear that the pur-
poses of this clause were simply to settle the question whether the exec-
utive branch should be plural or single and to give the executive a
title."' 68 Comparison with articles I and III supports this view. The
first section of article I merely defines the Congress it creates, and that
of article III provides that there shall be "one Supreme Court."
Neither specifies the powers conferred on the branch; that task is left to
subsequent sections.' 69
There would have been little point in granting specific executive
powers in sections 2 and 3 of article II if those and other powers had
already been conferred by way of a grant of "executive power" in sec-
tion 1.17° Even if it were possible to construe the first clause as vesting
all "executive power" in the President, a common-sense interpretation
of article III"' would suggest that it be read as a unit, with the first
164. See Roosevelt, quoted in text accompanying note 1 supra. But see contra notes 2
and 3 supra.
165. See note 4 supra.
166. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 632, 641 (1952) (Doug-
las, J., concurring); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 177, 183, 205, 228-29, 246-47 (1926)
(Holmes, McReynolds and Brandeis, JJ., dissenting); W. TAFT, supra note 2, at 144; R. BER-
GER, supra note 14, at 55-59; 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 513-14 (Gales ed. 1789) (remarks of Rep.
White). See also Madison, Helvidius letter no. II, supra note 118, at 152.
167. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 230-31 (1926) (McReynolds, J., dissenting);
I'ANNALS OF CONG. 545 (Gales ed. 1789) (remarks of Rep. Smith).
168. Corwin, The Steel Seizure Case,- A Judicial Brick Without Straw, 53 COLUM. L.
REV. 53 (1953).
169. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 8, 9; id. art. III, § 2.
170. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 228-29 (1926) (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
Cf. Madison, speaking of legislative power, in THE FEDERALIST, No. 41, at 263 (Mentor
Books 1961).
171. "That the general words of a grant are limited when followed by those of special
import is an established canon. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 229 (1926) (Mc-
Reynolds, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 7:1
Fall 1979] EXTRA-CONSTITUTIONAL EXECUTIVE POWER 27
clause merely referring in a general way to the powers which are con-
ferred specifically in later sections.'
7 2
Secondly, the phrase "the executive power" in clause 1 of article II
is in itself meaningless. "The executive power" comprises those mat-
ters which the executive is empowered to undertake;" 3 the abstract
concept "executive power" has no fixed or certain content. 7 4 Few have
172. The danger involved in attributing too much significance to minor differences in
wording between sections of the Constitution is illustrated by comparing the first sections of
articles II and III with one another. The latter provides that "[t]he judicial power of the
United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Con-
gress may from time to time . . . establish." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (emphasis added).
Surely the absence of the phrase "of the United States" in clause I of article II does not
indicate that the President can exercise all executive power, both of the federal and the state
governments. Yet attributing unrealistic importance to minor differences in wording could
lead one to that absurd conclusion.
173. See Senator Henry Clay (1835), quotedin Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 180
(1926).
174. This point is demonstrated by the "limitations" on executive power seen by those
who read the "vesting clause" as a grant of power. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. See, e.g.,
C. THACH, supra note 119, at 165: "Executive power is under a definite restriction, even if
the vesting clause be considered a grant, and one of a severe character. The national govern-
ment is one of restricted powers. The President may do nothing that the national govern-
ment may not do. But where, by the terms of the Constitution, the national government is
vested with control over a certain sphere of action, that portion of the field is the President's
which is executive in character" (emphasis added). Cf. Hamilton's vague limitation on the
power conferred by the vesting clause: "Interpreted in conformity to other parts [of] the
constitution and to the principles of free government," quoted in note 160 supra.
Thach's proposition is unsatisfactory because, first, if the vesting clause is a grant of
power, as he argues, where are the supposed restrictions on the national government found?
They are certainly not in article I, which deals only with Congress; nor in the Tenth Amend-
ment, which reserves only "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States" and, hence, does
not refer to power conferred by article II. Secondly, even if this aspect of Thach's argument
were accepted, and the President might act on any subject-matter falling within congres-
sional power, it simply begs the question to define the sphere of permissible presidential
action as that which is "executive in character." As Daniel Webster asked, "executive" on
what "model or example?" See text accompanying note 175 infra.
It is noteworthy that Thach refers to the field of foreign affairs to illustrate his proposi-
tion; that field is exceptional, the authority of the national government being derived extra-
constitutionally. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315-16,
318 (1936).
Australia, again, provides an informative comparison; while the subject-matters on
which the Commonwealth executive may act are, generally, those falling within Common-
wealth legislative power, action within that sphere is limited to that authorized by Parlia-
ment or the Constitution itself interpreted in the light of the royalprerogative. AUSTL. CONST.
§ 61. See Victoria v. Commonwealth, 134 C.L.R. 338, 405-06 (1975); Johnson v. Kent, 132
C.L.R. 164, 169 (1975); Barton v. Commonwealth, 131 C.L.R. 477 (1974).
Professor Crosskey, an adherent of the "inherent power" thesis, seemed to recognize the
need for some frame of reference for the definition of the "executive power" conferred by
the vesting clause; he employed the royal prerogative. See W. CROSSKEY, supra note 83, at
ch. XV. For a trenchant criticism of Crosskey's thesis, see Goebel, Exparte Clio, 54 COLIJM.
L. REV. 450, 473-76 (1954). See also note 181 infra.
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expressed this as eloquently as Daniel Webster in addressing the
United States Senate on February 16, 1835:
It is true, that the Constitution declares that the executive power
shall be vested in the President; but the first question which then
arises is, What is executive power? "hat is the degree, and what
are the limitations? Executive power is not a thing so well known,
and so accurately defined, as that the written constitution of a
limited government can be supposed to have conferred it in the
lump. What is executive power? What are its boundaries? What
model or example had the framers of the Constitution in their
minds, when they spoke of 'executive power?' Did they mean ex-
ecutive power as known in England, or as known in France, or as
known in Russia? Did they take it as defined by Montesquieu,
by Burlamaqui, or by De Lolme?175
The untenability of the "inherent power" thesis is emphasized by
its implications for the inter-relationship of congressional and pre-
sidental powers. If, as has been submitted, 17 6 executive powers con-
ferred expressly by the Constitution are immune from congressional
control, the "inherent power" thesis, maintaining that the vesting
clause is an express grant of power, would create a vast field in which
the executive was independent of congressional supervision. But, quite
obviously, that is not the legal position; there is no field of "inherent"
executive power free from congressional control,1 77 and even the pro-
ponents of "inherent power" have rarely claimed more than a presiden-
tial power to act in the absence of a contrary expression of will by
Congress. 78 Hence, the most that the vesting clause could be said to
confer is "executive power" subject to congressional control, for in-
stance under the "necessary and proper" clause.' 7 9 But, as discussed
above, 80 in such an event this power cannot be more than an implied
power. Once this fact is accepted, the whole thesis that the first clause
175. 4 D. WEBSTER, THE WORKS OF DANIEL WEBSTER 186 (1851) quoted in Myers v.
United States, 272 U.S. 52, 229-30 (1926) (emphasis in original). Justice McReynolds re-
garded Webster's argument as "exhaustive" and "conclusive." Id. at 229. See also I AN-
NALS OF CONG. 545 (Gales ed. 1789) (remarks of Rep. Smith).
176. See text accompanying note 140 supra.
177. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
178. See, e.g., the brief for the government in United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S.
459 (1915), quoted in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 690 (1952)
(Vinson, C.J., dissenting). But see Sofaer, The Presidency, War, and Foreign Affairs: Practice
Under the Framers, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 12, 37 (1976); 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 463,464
(Gales ed. 1789) (remarks of Rep. Madison).
179. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 231 (1926). See also Roche, Executive
Power and Domestic Emergency The Quest for Prerogative, 5 W. POL. Q. 592, 610 (1952).
180. See text accompanying notes 140-43 supra.
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of article II itself confers "[t]he executive power" collapses. 81
Accordingly, executive claims to "inherent" powers cannot prop-
erly be based on the first clause of article II. Presidents who purport to
derive powers from their position as "President"'' 8 2 or "Chief Execu-
tive"' or even "Head of State"'8 4 are in fact asserting the existence of
executive powers derived from outside the Constitution.
2 The Oath of Office
The oath or affirmation which the President is required to make
before entering office 8 5 is sometimes claimed as a source of broad ex-
ecutive power enabling him to take whatever action he considers neces-
sary to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United
States." ' 6 The earliest exponent of this view, as of other broad "con-
structions" of executive power, was President Lincoln, who rhetorically
asked Congress in his Special Session Message of July 4, 1861: "would
181. It might be argued, in reply, that this is not an all-or-nothing situation, whereby the
clause either confers some vast authority called "the executive power" or is not a power-
conferring provision at all; in short, that the difficulty of defining "the executive power" is
not a conclusive reason for giving it no content whatever. Proponents of this view might see
the power conferred by the clause as comprising a "core' of expressly-conferred power and
a "penumbra" of implied power flowing therefrom. Cf L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 159 (1978). It might be said, in reply to Webster, that there is no reason to seek
some abstract definition of "executive power," as Hamilton suggested (Pacificus letter no. I,
quotedin note 174 supra), "the executive power" might be defined by reference to the Con-
stitution as a whole, the history and context of its creation, subsequent governmental prac-
tice, and "the principles of free government." But even these criteria lend no support to the
"inherent power" thesis; the records of the Federal Convention "make it clear" that the
vesting clause was not intended as a grant of power, Corwin, supra note 168, at 53, and the
constitutional framework and "principles of free government" indicate that Congress has a
general primacy over the Executive-so the vesting clause contains no "core" of executive
power immune from congressional control. See note 148 supra. As Justice Jackson wrote:
"With all its defects, delays and inconveniences, men have discovered no technique for long
preserving free government except that the Executive be under the law, and that the law be
made by parliamentary deliberations." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579, 655 (1952). Nor does governmental practice support the "inherent power" thesis; even
the asserted executive power to take any action necessary to defend the nation-the strong-
est claimant to represent the "core" of authority allegedly conferred by the vesting clause-
is subject to congressional control. See War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-48
(Supp. 1979); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 668 et. seq. (1952) (a
decision rendered in wartime, concerning executive action taken during war and related to
the war effort) (see Vinson, C.J., dissenting).
182. E..-, President Franklin Roosevelt's Executive Order No. 9066, 3 C.F.R. 1092-93
(1942).
183. See Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 345 (1946) (Burton, J., dissenting);
Note, Honored in the Breech, supra note 145, at 133.
184. Note, Honored in the Breech, supra note 145, at 134 n.34.
185. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7.
186. Id
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not the official oath be broken if the Government should be over-
thrown when it was believed that disregarding the single law would
tend to preserve it?"' 87 Lincoln ultimately found it unnecessary to rely
upon his oath of office, 18 8 but others have seen it as a source from
which broad executive powers may be implied. Justice Powell, for in-
stance, relied upon the presidential oath of office in finding an execu-
tive power to indulge in electronic surveillance of persons allegedly
plotting domestically to overthrow the government by unlawful
means.18 9
It is submitted that the presidential oath of office is not a source of
power. t90 The case for reading clause 7 of article I119t as a grant of
power is even weaker than that regarding clause 1192 because the for-
mer, unlike the latter, does not refer to executive power at all. Unlike
section 3 of article II, clause 7 does not even expressly impose a duty on
the President, although such duty can obviously be inferred.
Even if one were to accept the proposition that clause 7 imposes on
the President the vague duty to "preserve, protect, and defend the Con-
stitution," it does not imply, as Justice Powell seemed to believe, 93 that
the powers needed to fulfil that duty are conferred in the same clause.
The Constitution must be viewed as a whole, and there is no reason to
examine the presidential oath in isolation. It is reasonable to assume
that the founding fathers saw the oath as obliging the President to use
whatever powers were granted to him for the purposes expressed in the
oath, but did not regard it as, itself conferring any power on him.' 9 4 It
is submitted that clause 7 confers no power on the President, and the
obligation imposed therein is to be discharged by executing the powers
given him by the Constitution and by Congress. Once he has employed
those powers, the President has acted "to the best of [his] ability" and,
187. See 6 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 69, at 25. Lincoln
interpreted his oath of office as imposing upon him "the duty of preserving by every indis-
pensable means, that government-that nation-of which that Constitution was the organic
law." Letter to A.G. Hodges, Apr. 4, 1864, supra note 85, at 281.
188. "But it was not believed that this question was presented. It was not believed that
any law was violated." 6 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 69, at 25.
189. See United States v. United States Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 310 (1972) (Powell, J.).
The Fourth Amendment, however, requires the prior issue of a warrant. Id at 320. But c.
Griffin v. Wilcox, 21 Ind. 370, 383 (1863).
190. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 119, at 448; In re Kemp, 16
Wis. 359, 391-92 (1863).
191. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7.
192. Id art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
193. Note 189 supra.
194. The historical evidence supports this interpretation. See E. CORWIN, supra note 5,
at 63.
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therefore, fulfilled his constitutional duty.
195
3. The Commander-in-Chief Clause
Yet another constitutional provision which has been employed as
a foundation for expansive executive power is article II, section 2,
which states: "[tihe President shall be commander-in-chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several
States, when called into the actual service of the United States."' 196
Once again, the first important exponent of a broad interpretation of
this clause was President Lincoln, who combined it with his duty to
"take care that the laws be faithfully executed"' 197 to create a so-called
presidential "war-power."' 198 Lincoln asserted that as commander-in-
chief he had "a right to take any measure which may best subdue the
enemy"'199 and put this claim into effect when he freed the slaves of the
rebel states "as a fit and necessary war measure for suppressing [the]
rebellion."'2"° In issuing his Emancipation Proclamation of January 1,
1863, Lincoln expressly relied upon his power as commander-in-chief
of the army and navy at a time of armed rebellion20 and claimed that
his action was "warranted by the Constitution upon military neces-
sity."2 °2 Although Lincoln's conception of his powers as commander-
in-chief was contrary to contemporary constitutional jurisprudence20 3
and was strenuously criticized in a pamphlet by former Justice Cur-
tis,2°4 the patriotic fervor of the nation was such that his views received
judicial endorsement 2°-at least until the war was over.20 6 Claims of
wide presidential powers derived from the commander-in-chief clause
195. See In re Kemp, 16 Wis. 359, 391-92 (1863). Although the United States undoubt-
edly has power to preserve, protect and defend the Constitution, "the fact that power exists
in the Government does not vest it in the President." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 604 (1952) (Frankfurter, J. concurring). Accord id. at 629 (Douglas,
J., concurring).
196. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
197. Id. art. II, § 3.
198. See E. CORWIN, supra note 5, at 229.
199. Reply to Emancipation Memorial Presented by Chicago Christians of All Denomi-
nations, September 13, 1862, 5 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note
85, at 421.
200. Proclamation of January 1, 1863, 6 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS,
supra note 69, at 158. See also E. CORWIN, supra note 5, at 405 n.72.
201. 6 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 69, at 158. See also Presi-
dent Lincoln's proclamation of September 22, 1862. Id at 96.
202. Id, at 159.
203. See Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603, 615 (1850).
204. See Curtis, Executive Power, supra note 72, at 306-35.
205. See Exparle Vallandigham, 28 F. Cas. 874, 922 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1863) (No. 16, 816).
But see Jones v. Seward, 40 Barb. 563, 572 (1863). See also Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black)
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continue to be heard occasionally, especially in time of war.
However, an examination of the clause in its constitutional con-
text, taking into consideration the related and complementary powers
of Congress, does not warrant executive claims to a broad power to do
whatever is thought necessary for national defense. After all, it is Con-
gress, not the President, which is to create and regulate the armed
forces, 20 8 pay for them, 209 declare war2 10 and enact laws "necessary and
proper" to execute these powers.21' The only power which the clause
expressly vests in the President is that of acting as commander-in-chief
of the armed forces-and even that power is conferred by way of as-
signing him an office, rather than by an express grant of power.212 As
Alexander Hamilton wrote, this power amounts "to nothing more than
the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces,
as first general and admiral" of the United States.213 The clause gives
635, 668, 670 (1863)but see id at 698-99 (Nelson, J., joined by Taney, C.I, Catron & Clif-
ford, JJ., dissenting).
206. Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866) (decided after the Civil War had
ended).
207. See Ken-Rad Tube & Lamp Corp. v. Badeau, 55 F. Supp. 193, 197-98 (W.D. Ky.
1944). See also Dean Rusk, quoted in A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 4, at 169; Richard
Nixon's reply to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, N.Y. Times, March 12, 1976,
at 14, col. 2; R. Longaker, supra note 4 at 164-65 n.30; A. SCHLESINGER, Epilogue, supra
note 133, at 450-52.
208. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12-16.
209. Id art. I, § 8, ci. 1; § 9, ci. 7.
210. Id art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
211. Id art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
212. Ascertaining just what power is conferred expressly by this clause, and what is im-
plied therefrom, is especially difficult. These uncertainties have been responsible for some
assertions of far-reaching executive power immune from congressional control. See, e.g.,
Secretary of State Acheson, quotedin R. Longaker, supra note 4, at 135; R. Longaker, id at
165 n.30. See also King & Leavens, supra note 140, at 60, 62, 79, 80, 88 n.152, 90. The ambit
of the President's power as commander-in-chief must be determined by "[its] nature, and by
the principles of our institutions." Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 139 (1866) (Chase,
C.J.). Accordingly, recourse must be had to the usual sources of constitutional interpreta-
tion to amplify the rather cryptic words of this clause: the opinions of the Framers, govern-
mental practice, judicial dicta, and "the principles of our institutions." On perusing the
records of the Federal Convention, for instance, it is seen that it was intended that, as com-
mander-in-chief, the President would have power "to repel sudden attacks" upon the United
States. See 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 318-19
(rev. ed. 1937). See also Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1863). Congress, the Presi-
dent, and the War Powers, supra note 140, at 216 (statement of Assistant Attorney General
Rehnquist); King & Leavens, supra note 140, at 69-71, 85-86, 90 (a questionable analysis).
213. THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 418 (Mentor Books 1961). Accord, Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 645-46 (1952); Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2,
139 (1866); Curtis, Executive Power, supra note 72, at 321-23; Jones v. Seward, 40 Barb. 563,
572 (1863).
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the President no authority over civilian affairs214 and certainly does not
authorize him "to do anything, anywhere that can be done with an
army or navy."
215
Although within these modest bounds the President is legally in-
dependent of congressional control,216 it would be politically and, we
believe, constitutionally improper for him to regard his military role as
anything more than a protective device to ensure civilian control of the
armed forces. 217 Presidents should find no inconsistency between the
office of President and that of commander-in-chief of the armed
forces;218 but, if they do, the former must always prevail. The existence
of a military force is, after all, merely a means for protecting the nation
and its government, including the office of the President. However, it is
a means only, not an end in itself.219 A "first general and admiral"
22
cannot constitutionally have objectives or policies different from those
of the nation's government.
214. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 632, 643-44 (1952); Curtis,
Executive Power, supra note 72, at 328. But f Burton, J., obiter in the Youngstown case:
"Nor is it claimed that the current seizure is in the nature of a military command addressed
by the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to a mobilized nation waging, or imminently
threatened with, total war." 343 U.S. at 659 (emphasis added). For examples of the sort of
action Justice Burton presumably had in mind, see CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
supra note 119, at 453-58; but see E. CORWIN, supra note 70, at 149, 158-59. See also Gen-
eral Haig's comment to Deputy Attorney General Ruckelshaus at the "Saturday night mas-
sacre," quoted in R. BERGER, supra note 14, at 349. (For a slightly different version of this
comment, and a later comment by Haig, see B. WOODWARD & C. BERNSTEIN, THE FINAL
DAYS 77, 211 (Coronet ed. 1977, orig. publ. 1976).
215. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 642 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
216. Id at 644; Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 139 (1866); Swaim v. United
States, 28 Ct. Cl. 173, 221 (1893), a'd, 165 U.S. 553 (1897); Congress, the President, and the
War Powers, supra note 140, at 33, 36, 49 (statement of Professor Mallison), 47, 79 (Profes-
sor Bickel), 216 (Assistant Attorney General Rehnquist), 226, 228 (Mr. Stevenson). Cf. Pres-
ident Lincoln: "I conceive that I may in an emergency do things on military grounds which
cannot be done constitutionally by Congress." 3 C. SANDBURG, ABRAHAM LINCOLN: THE
WAR YEARS 132 (1939) (comment to Senator Zachariah Chandler, July 4, 1864), 4 J. RAN-
DALL & R. CURRENT, LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 194 (1955). For the content of this in-
dependent presidential sphere, see R. BERGER, supra note 14, at 108-16.
217. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 646 (1952). Other
constitutional provisions are designed to keep the army in check. See U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 12; amends. II and III.
218. See the remarks of President Johnson when signing the Tonkin Gulf Resolution in
1964, quoted in 1973 Hearings, pt. 1, supra note 65, at 50, and Senator Frank Church's
comment thereon. Id at 55.
219. See United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967), quotedin Zweibon v. Mitchell,
516 F.2d 594, 604 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976). Cf. Exparte Milli-
gan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 126 (1866).
220. See Hamilton, supra note 213.
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4. Execution of the Laws
The fourth peg upon which claims of "inherent" executive power
have been hung is the President's constitutional duty to "take care that
the laws be faithfully executed." '221 The liberal interpretation of the
"take care" clause 222 would include within the word "laws" not only
statutes, the Constitution,223 and treaties, 224 but also "the rights, duties
and obligations growing out of the Constitution itself, our international
relations, and all the protection implied by the nature of the govern-
ment under the Constitution. ' 225 Proponents of this view do not re-
strict the President to execution of the statutes in accordance with their
terms.226 They would allow the President wide authority to take any
action necessary to ensure maintenance of the peace 227 and national
interests.228 Thus, the Supreme Court, relying on this interpretation of
the clause, has held that, without statutory authority, the President may
afford protection to a Supreme Court justice,229 request the courts to
enjoin action interfering with interstate commerce and the transporta-
tion of the mails23° or himself use force to the same end.231 Moreover,
the President has been conceded great flexibility in choosing the man-
ner in which to implement legislation. He has been allowed to employ
virtually any means not forbidden by Congress,232 even military
force.233 Typically, the greatest claim was made by President Lincoln,
221. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
222. Id
223. See In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 64 (1890) (opinion of the Court), 83 (Lamar, J., dis-
senting).
224. See id, at 64; Hamilton, Pacificus letter no. I, supra note 83, at 43; W. TAFT, supra
note 2 at 85-88.
225. In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 64 (1890). This dictum of Justice Miller, delivering the
opinion of the Court, expressed in the form of a rhetorical question, was broader than was
necessary for the decision of the case, and Miller stated his conclusion in more modest lan-
guage. See id at 67. Indeed, the President's power to appoint Supreme Court judges, U.S.
CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, may imply a power to protect them from assassination. Accord 10
Op. Att'y. Gen. 74, 82 (1861).
226. See In re Dugan, 6 D.C. 131, 145 (1865); opinions of Attorney General Cushing
(1853-1854) discussed in E. CORWIN, supra note 5, at 149; notes 227-233 infra.
227. Justice Miller held that there is a "peace of the United States." In re Neagle, 135
U.S. 1, 69 (1890).
228. E. CORWIN, supra note 70, at 191.
229. In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 67 (1890).
230. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 599 (1895).
231. Id at 582, 599 (obiter dictum).
232. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 701-02 (1952) (Vinson,
C.J., dissenting). See also note 228 supra.
233. See In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 582, 599 (1895). See also Exparte Siebold, 100 U.S.
371, 395 (1879); The Parkhill, 18 F. Cas. 1187, 1197 (D.C.E.D. Pa. 1861) (No. 10,755a); W.
TAFT, supra note 2, at 97; Pye & Lowell, supra note 73, at 621. But see Campisi, The Civil
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who maintained that he could disregard some laws if he believed it
necessary for the preservation of the great bulk of them, including the
Constitution.234 As he put it, with characteristic eloquence, "often a
limb must be amputated to save a life; but a life is never wisely given to
save a limb. 235
Although the "take care" clause is expressed in the form of a duty,
not a power, the provision must, by implication, authorize the President
to exercise the authority necessary to ensure "that the laws be faithfully
executed." In the case of statutes, the duty imposed on the President by
the clause is one that "does not go beyond the laws or require him to
achieve more than Congress sees fit to leave within his power." 236 The
clause leaves no room for the exercise of presidential power beyond
congressional control; one does not execute a law by disobeying it.237
Disturbance Regulations: Threats Old and New, 50 IND. L.J. 757, 777 (1975); Engdahl, The
New Civil Disturbance Regulations: The Threat of Military Intervention, 49 IND. L.J. 581,
607-17 (1974); Comment, Executive Military Power: A Path to American Dictatorship, 54
NEB. L. REV. 111 (1975); Note, Honored in the Breech, supra note 145, at 132-37. See also
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
234. See Lincoln, Special Session Message to Congress, quoted in note 69 supra. But see
note 237 infra.
235. Letter to A.G. Hodges, April 4, 1864, supra note 85, at 281.
236. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 177 (1926) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Accordid
at 184, 292 (McReynolds and Brandeis, JJ., dissenting); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610, 633 (1952) (Frankfurter and Douglas, JJ., concurring).
The President's duty, under this clause, to "take care that the [Constitution] be faith-
fully executed," (see note 223 supra) extends no further, it is submitted, than to carrying out
the obligations imposed upon him by the Constitution either expressly or by necessary im-
plication. An example may be the actual decision in In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 67 (1890).
Some commentators, referred to above, have suggested that his duty-and, hence, his
power-is wider, but the relevant Supreme Court dicta were not only obiter, but were also
far wider than was necessary for determination of the cases. See, e.g., In re Debs, 158 U.S.
564, 582, 599 (1895); Inre Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 64 (1890); Exparte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 395
(1879). Moreover, they run counter to later comments by leading Supreme Court judges:
see Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610, 633 (1952) (Frankfurter
and Douglas, JJ., concurring); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 292 (1926) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting). See also N. SMALL, supra note 3, at 123.
In taking care that treaties are "faithfully executed," the President can rely on the "take
care" clause, see note 224 supra, together with his "very delicate, plenary and exclusive
power . . . as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international rela-
tions." See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936). This
subject is beyond the scope of this paper.
237. The "take care" clause imposes on the President a duty to execute all laws; the word
"faithfully" itself suggests this. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 187 (1926); Kendall
v. United States exrei Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 613 (1838); President Jackson's Nullifi-
cation Proclamation, quotedin L. HENKIN, supra note 14, at 356 n.59. In our opinion, where
the President believes that a statute unconstitutonally invades executive powers which are
immune from congressional control, he must comply with it until it is declared invalid by
the courts, although he is entitled "to take appropriate steps to have the law tested." Assis-
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III. Extra-Constitutional Executive Power
It has been seen that, upon proper construction, none of the four
constitutional provisions suggested as a basis for a broad executive
power to do whatever is thought necessary for the preservation of the
nation and its constitution will support that claim. Hence, if the notion
of "inherent" executive powers is to have any legal validity, it must rely
on some extra-constitutional source of power. Yet, none of the propo-
nents of "inherent" executive power has explained how a doctrine of
extra-constitutional power might be legally justified. We propose to
consider two arguments upon which an advocate of extra-constitutional
executive power might rely, and to examine whether they have any le-
gal validity. Our discussion is confined to the claim that the exercise of
extra-constitutional powers is lawful. Those who admit its unlawful-
ness, yet advocate it nonetheless, are arguing in the realm of practical
politics, not law, and such matters lie beyond the scope of this paper.
The first argument in support of extra-constitutional executive
powers is that the exercise of powers which the Constitution does not
confer would not be unlawful if, for some reason, the Constitution were
"suspended." No doubt an argument could be constructed along these
lines, employing the few judicial dicta to the effect that the Constitu-
tion,23 8 or its guaranty of civil liberties, 239 may be suspended in time of
war or insurrection. But these dicta do not represent the prevailing
doctrine of the Supreme Court, which recognizes that, although the
Constitution (including its amendments) must be interpreted in the
light of changing circumstances, 240 it is never "suspended."24 The
tant Attorney General Rehnquist, quotedin R. BERGER, supra note 14, at 309. See generally
id at 306-09; E. CoRwIN, supra note 5, at 65-66; E. CORWIN, supra note 70, at 156.
238. See State v. Brown, 71 W. Va. 519, 521, 522, 554-55, 77 S.E. 243, 244, 245, 258
(1912). This case dealt with the West Virginia Constitution.
239. See Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 330 (1946) (Murphy, J., concurring);
Constantin v. Smith, 57 F.2d 227, 240 (E.D. Tex.), afIdsub nom. Sterling v. Constantin, 287
U.S. 378 (1932); State ex rel. Cleveringa v. Klein, 63 N.D. 514, 249 N.W. 118, 124 (1933).
Cf Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 485, 487-88 (1944). Some of the many cases
dealing with "martial rule" (or "martial law")-most of them in state courts, and frequently
displaying considerable confusion on the subject-also lend support to the notion that in
time of war or insurrection the Constitution, or part of it, may be suspended. See generally
Pye & Lowell, supra note 73, at 605-07 n.66, 624-26 n.122, where some of the authorities are
referred to; Comment, MartialLaw, 42 S. CAL. L. REV. 546 (1969).
240. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 442-43 (1934).
241. See United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967); Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327
U.S. 304, 342 (1946) (Murphy, J., concurring); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 460
(1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 110 (1943); Exparie Milligan, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 2, 120-21 (1866); Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 627 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. de-
nied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); Beaver County Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Winowich, 323 Pa. 483,
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existence of war or other crises is a relevant factor in construing the
constitutional text,24 but "[t]he Constitution is for all seasons. '243 It
was framed by men who had experienced war. They wrote a document
which recognized that the nation would be faced with problems of
war,244 invasion,24 5 insurrection,2 4 6 rebelion247 and domestic vio-
lence,248 and they gave Congress and the President power to deal with
them. The suggestion that, if and when these vicissitudes arise, the
Constitution should be suspended, because it was not intended to oper-
ate in times of crisis, is not only factually incorrect,249 but also subver-
sive of the system of constitutional democracy practiced in the United
States.2
The second argument is that "the People of the United States,
2 1 I
from whom the Constitution derives its authority,2 52 have transferred
powers to the President in addition to those given him in article II of
the Constitution. 3  Consideration of this thesis must begin with an
511, 187 A. 481, 493 (1936); Johnson v. Jones, 44 M. 142, 155, 165 (1867); Corbin v. Marsh,
63 Ky. (2 Duv.) 193, 194 (1865); Jones v. Seward, 40 Barb. 563, 566, 573 (1863); Johnson v.
Duncan, 3 Martin (O.S.) 530, 549 (La. 1815). But see E. CORWIN, supra note 5, at 252, and
ESSAYS, supra note 75, at 167.
242. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 220 (1944); Yasui v. United States,
320 U.S. 115 (1943); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, esp. at 111-112 (1943) (Mur-
phy, concurring); Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 84 (1909); United States v. Ford, 265 F.
424, 425 (S.D. Ohio 1920), afd, 281 F. 298 (6th Cir. 1922), rev'don other grounds, 264 U.S.
239 (1924). See also Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, October 17, 1788, in 1
B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 614 (1971).
243. Ramsey Clark in 1973 Hearings, supra note 65 at pt. 2, 509.
244. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11; § 10, cl. 3; art. III, § 3, cl. 1; amends. III and V.
245. See id art. I, § 8, cl. 15; § 9, cl. 2; art. IV, § 4.
246. See id art I, § 8, cl. 15.
247. See id art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
248. See id art. IV, §4.
249. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 425 (1934).
250. See remarks of Congressman James M. Beck, January 10, 1934, quoted in Clark,
Emergencies and the Law, 49 POL. SC. Q. 268, 279 n.46 (1934).
251. See U.S. CONST. preamble. On the origin of this wording in the preamble, see M.
FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 190-91 (1913).
252. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403, 404-05 (1819); Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 324 (1816); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.)
419, 470-71 (1793); THE FEDERALIST, No. 49, supra note 213 at 313-14 (J. Madison); 2 M.
FARRAND, supra note 212, at 476 (remarks of James Madison). See also G. WooD, supra
note 46, at 532-36, 539-42, 596-600.
253. See President Roosevelt's address to Congress regarding the Emergency Price Con-
trol Act, September 7, 1942, quoted in E. CORWIN, supra note 5, at 250-5 1, and Professor
Corwin's comment thereon, id at 252. The political essence of this idea was brilliantly ex-
plained by Professor Arthur Schlesinger in his exposition of Richard Nixon's revolutionary
concept of the "plebiscitary presidency." See A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 4, at 254-66.
Professor Schlesinger wrote: "The mandate, it was alleged, justified the President in doing
anything that he believed the interests of the nation required him to do .... The mandate
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examination of the constitutional text. The Constitution declares that it
"shall be the supreme law of the land, '2 54 together with the statutes and
treaties made in accordance with it. This declaration implies that the
validity of any claim to exercise governmental authority must be tested
by its compatibility with the provisions of the three components of "the
supreme law of the land." '255 This understanding is strengthened by the
Tenth Amendment to the Constitution, which provides that "[tihe pow-
ers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohib-
ited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." The people, accordingly, retain powers which have not been
"delegated to" the United States, but which the states nevertheless lack.
Potential executive powers of the United States, executive powers be-
yond those conferred on the President by the Constitution, clearly fall
within this category;256 hence, they were retained by the people. If the
President is to claim successfully that these powers now belong to him,
he must explain when and by what means the people have transferred
them to him--either expressly or by implication.257
became the source of wider power than any President had ever claimed before. Whether a
conscious or unconscious revolutionary, Nixon was carrying the imperial Presidency toward
its ultimate form in the plebiscitary Presidency-with the President accountable only once
every four years, shielded in the years between elections from congressional and public har-
assment, empowered by his mandate to make war or to make peace, to spend or to impound,
to give out information or to hold it back, superseding congressional legislation by executive
order, all in the name of a majority whose choice must prevail till it made another choice
four years later ... ." Id at 255. The legal implication of this doctrine is nicely captured in
Michels' comment that, with Napoleon III, "[t]he plebiscite was a purifying bath which gave
legitimate sanction to every illegality." R. MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES 231 (E. & C. Paul
transl. 1915), quoted in A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 4, at 264. See also M. WEBER, THE
THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 387-88 (A. Henderson & T. Parsons
transl., T. Parsons ed., Free Press, 1964); Introd. by T. Parsons, id at 74.
254. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (emphasis added).
255. See Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 257 (1967); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6
(1957); Exparte Quirin 317 U.S. 1, 25 (1942). But this proposition may not apply fully to
foreign relations, power over which was, supposedly, transferred to the national government
prior to adoption of the Constitution. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,
299 U.S. 304, 315-16, 317, 318 (1936). See also note 23 supra. However, even in that field,
the government must not contravene the provisions of the Constitution (see Curtiss-Wright,
299 U.S. at 320), and some judges have preferred to rest the foreign affairs power on an
implied constitutional grant. See Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 257 (1967) (Black, J.). In
Reid v. Covert, Justice Black held that "[t]he United States is entirell' a creature of the Con-
stitution. Its power and authority have no other source." 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957) (emphasis
added).
256. The states lack these powers because they (obviously) did not possess them prior to
the establishment of the United States, and have not subsequently been granted them. Cf.
Uther v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation, 74 C.L.R. 508, 530-31 (1947); Commonwealth
v. Cigamatic Pty. Ltd., 108 C.L.R. 372, 378, 389, 390 (1962).
257. Cf. note 255 supra (President's power in the area of international relations).
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258The Constitution, in its amendment provision, provides a
method by which the people may add to, or subtract from, the powers
of the President, but they have not availed themselves of this power.
Whether or not the people may transfer powers to the President---or
anyone else-by a procedure other than that specified in article V,25 9
and whether or not such a process would result in a constitutional
"amendment," are questions which, although interesting, need not de-
tain us. There is no evidence whatsoever that the people have expressly
granted any powers to anyone by any means other than the Constitu-
tion, as amended.
If the President cannot establish that the people have expressly
conferred these powers on him, he may yet rely on an implied grant.
Three arguments could conceivably be made to this effect. First, it may
be contended that implied in the nature of the presidency are the pre-
rogatives of the British Crown, which include some of the alleged
broad executive powers.260 It would be argued that this implication
represents an implied constitutional grant of power and, hence, is con-
sistent with the Tenth Amendment.261 The short answer to this conten-
tion is that the historical evidence overwhelmingly indicates that, if the
founding fathers were certain of anything, it was that the President
should not inherit the prerogatives of the British monarchy.262
A related argument is that the President has wide powers, not
258. U.S. CONST. art. V.
259. Although art. V does not expressly stipulate that the procedures specified therein are
the only method by which the Constitution may be amended, the maxim expressio unius est
exclusio alterius may apply, with the result that the article would be interpreted to provide
so by implication. See L. ORFIELD, THE AMENDING OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 38-39
(1942). Cf. Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 227 (1920); see J. JAMESON, A TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS 623-24 (4th ed. 1887). But see E. CORWIN, supra note 70,
at 271; James Madison, Helvidius letter no. III (1793), 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON, supra note 118, at 164: "If there be a principle that ought not. to be questioned
within the United States, it is, that every nation has a right to abolish an old government and
establish a new one. This principle is not only recorded in every public archive, written in
every American heart, and sealed with the blood of a host of American martyrs; but it is the
only lawful tenure by which the United States hold their existence as a nation."
260. See Burmah Oil Co. Ltd. v. Lord Advocate, [1965] A.C. 75 (H.L. 1964). The powers
of the Crown are, of course, subject to statute, whereas advocates of "inherent" presidential
powers may claim that the latter are immune from congressional control.
261. See M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406 (1819). But it is seriously
open to question whether such executive power would be one "delegated to the United
States by the Constitution."
262. See Thomas Jefferson's Draft of a Constitution for Virginia (1783), 6 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 298-99 (J. Boyd ed. 1952): "By Executive powers we mean no refer-
ence to those powers exercised under our former government by the Crown as of its preroga-
tive. . . ." See also R. BERGER, supra note 14, at 56; E. CORWIN, supra note 5, at 6.
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through succession to the royal prerogative, but by virtue of the com-
mon law (or even "natural law") "principle of necessity." By this prin-
ciple, action normally unlawful becomes lawful if it is necessary for the
preservation of society.263 A plethora of judicial dicta could be mus-
tered in support of a claim that, by drawing an analogy with the indi-
vidual's right of self-defense, American constitutional jurisprudence
has recognized a "principle of necessity, '264 sometimes expressed in the
form of the maxims "necessity knows no law" and "salus popul;
suprema lex.' '2 65 To take merely one such dictum, Justice Holmes,
speaking for a unanimous Supreme Court, proclaimed that "[w]hen it
comes to a decision by the head of the State upon a matter involving its
life, the ordinary rights of individuals must yield to what he deems the
necessities of the moment. Public danger warrants the substitution of
executive process for judicial process. '"266
The argument based upon the concept of "necessity" is that, be-
cause the United States was born into a common law environment, to
the extent that the Constitution does not provide otherwise, its people
have impliedly granted the President powers which would inhere in the
executive by virtue of common law doctrines (other than the royal pre-
rogative, of course). Clearly, the President could not rely on such im-
plied powers in the face of contrary legislation, for the Constitution
expressly requires him to ensure that the laws be executed.267 More-
263. See J. LOCKE, supra note 40; text accompanying note 101 supra. See also Burmah
Oil Co. Ltd. v. Lord Advocate, [1965] A.C. 75, 100, 106, 118, 156 (H.L. 1964); B. NWABUEZE,
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE EMERGENT STATES 180-214 (1973); B. NWABUEZE, JUDICIAL-
ISM IN COMMONWEALTH AFRICA ch. VII, esp. at 175 (1977). Cf Madzimbamuto v.
Lardner-Burke, [1969] 1 A.C. 645, 732-33, 740 (P.C. 1968) (Lord Pearce, dissenting). For an
exhaustive discussion of this doctrine, see F.M. BROOKFIELD, SOME ASPECTS OF THE NE-
CESSITY PRINCIPLE IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (D. Phil. thesis, Balliol College, Oxford, 1972).
264. See United States v. Pacific R.R., 120 U.S. 227, 234 (1887); Exparte Milligan, 71
U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 127 (1866); Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115, 134-35, 139-40
(185 1); Constantin v. Smith, 57 F.2d 227, 240 (E.D. Tex.), a f'dsub norm. Sterling v. Constan-
tin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932); Exparte Vallandigham, 28 F. Cas. 874, 921 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1863)
(No. 16, 816); In re Boyle, 6 Idaho 609, 612, 57 P. 706, 707 (1899), appeal dismissed ub nom.
Boyle v. Sinclair, 178 U.S. 611 (1900); Griffin v. Wilcox, 21 Ind. 370. 377-78 (1863); Com-
monwealth v. Blodgett, 53 Mass. (12 Met.) 56, 84, 88-89 (1846). See also Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to J.B. Colvin, supra note 69, at 542.
265. See note 71 supra.
266. Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 85 (1909). Subsequent Supreme Court decisions
have narrowed this dictum, holding that the question whether the action taken was reason-
ably necessary in the circumstances is subject to judicial review. See Duncan v.
Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 336 (1946); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 234
(1944); Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 401 (1932). See also United States v. Chalk, 441
F.2d 1277, 1281 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 943 (1971); Middendorfv. Henry, 425 U.S.
25, 67 (1976).
267. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
[Vol. 7:1
Fall 1979] EXTRA-CONSTITUTIONAL EXECUTIVE POWER 41
over, the President cannot employ the "principle of necessity" even
when Congress is silent; even if the principle were part of the law of the
United States, why should the "necessary" powers inhere in the Presi-
dent, rather than Congress?268 Bearing in mind the presence in the
Constitution of a clause conferring on Congress power to enact laws
"necessary and proper for carrying into execution" the powers of the
United States,269 it is reasonable to suppose that Congress is the benefi-
ciary of any common law "principle of necessity." The submission
based on necessity is simply far too tenuous to support an aggrandize-
ment of presidential power,2 70 especially as it would result in the Presi-
dent exercising the royal prerogative by a "back-door" method.
A third argument for recognition of an implied grant of executive
power is that the Constitution has been amended in effect by govern-
mental practice.271 Proponents of this view may seek to rely on a dic-
tum of Justice Frankfurter in the Steel Seizure case:
It is an inadmissibly narrow conception of American constitu-
tional law to confine it to the words of the Constitution and to
disregard the gloss which life has written upon them. In short, a
systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the
knowledge of Congress and never before questioned,. . . mak-
ing as it were such exercise of power part of the structure of our
government, may be treated as a gloss on 'executive Power'
vested in the President by § 1 of Art. 11.272
Properly understood,273 this dictum is merely a reminder that the Con-
stitution was "intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently,
to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs."274 It should be
interpreted in the light of modern conditions, without slavish adher-
ence to the intentions of the founding fathers.275 However, powers do
not vest in a governmental branch merely because they have been
claimed by it.276 Nor can it be said that presidential claims to "inher-
268. "[Tlhe fact that power exists in the Government does not vest it in the President."
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 604 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring).
269. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (emphasis added).
270. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 649-50 (1952) (Jack-
son, J., concurring). See also Wilmerding, supra note 74 at 333-38.
271. See, e.g., Bowman, Presidential Emergency Powers Related to International Economic
Transactions. Congressional Recognition of Customary Authority, I 1 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 515, 522, 528-34 (1978).
272. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
273. See R. BERGER, supra note 14, at 98.
274. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819).
275. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 442-43 (1934).
276. See The Floyd Acceptances, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 666, 677 (1868). Similarly, Lord
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ent" powers have "never before [been] questioned;" 277 it has been seen
that every broad interpretation of provisions in article II of the Consti-
tution has been matched by a narrower one. A long period of congres-
sional silence, in regard to a particular executive practice of which it
has knowledge, leads, at most, to the inference that Congress has acqui-
esced in that specific exercise of power. 78 But this acquiescence results
only in an implied (and revocable) delegation of power by Congress,
not in an implied constitutional amendment. Hence, this argument,
like the others based upon express or implied extra-constitutional
grants of executive power, must be rejected.
The danger presented to constitutional democracy by theories
built on an imaginary popular grant is obvious, especially when it is
recalled that such theories formed the basis of the absolute power of the
political structure in Hobbes' Leviathan279 and of the later Roman em-
perors. Justinian's Digest, referring to such a fictitious28 ° grant of
power, shows where such theories lead: "What the Emperor has deter-
mined has the force of a statute; seeing that by alex regia which was
passed on the subject of his sovereignty, the people transfer to him and
confer upon him the whole of their sovereignty and power."
28 1
Conclusion
It has been argued that outside the area of foreign relations, the
President has no powers beyond those expressly or impliedly granted
him by the Constitution, and that the Constitution does not confer any
"inherent" executive power. It is appropriate to conclude this discus-
sion of the nature of extra-constitutional powers with some observa-
tions on the danger they present to American constitutional democracy.
Denman, C.J., once observed that "[t]he practice of a ruling power in the State is but a
feeble proof of its legality." Stockdale v. Hansard, 9 Ad. & E. 1, 155, 112 Eng. Rep. 1112,
1171 (Q.B. 1839), quotedin R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMA-
TION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 375 (1977).
277. See text accompanying note 271 supra.
278. See United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 475, 481 (1915).
279. T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 227 (C. Macpherson ed. 1968).
280. See ULLMANN, POLITICAL THOUGHT, supra note 96, at 215.
281. 1 THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN 23 (1.4.1) (C. Monro transl. 1904). Accord THE INSTI-
TUTES OF JUSTIANIAN 5 (1.2.6) (J. Thomas transl. 1975). For a discussion of Bracton's use of
these passages, see ULLMANN, GOVERNMENT supra note 96, at 176-77; D. HANSON, supra
note 101, at 102-13. Some medieval writers employed these passages to restrict royal absolu-
tism and develop theories of popular sovereignty. See ULLMANN, GOVERNMENT supra note
96, at 223, 297; W. ULLMANN, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE AGES 249-50 (1975); 2 Q.
SKINNER, THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT 130-34 (1978). See also id
at 331-32, 341-43.
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It has been observed that there are two approaches to the exercise
of executive powers beyond those conferred by the Constitution. At
first, the action taken by the President is admitted to be unconstitu-
tional and unlawful, but is said to be practically necessary, and hence
politically-though not legally-justified. The alternative thesis is that
the exercise of such powers is lawful, although non-constitutional, be-
cause these powers are derived from a source (or sources) outside the
Constitution. The latter is the much more dangerous of the two.
When the first approach is adopted the legal continuity of the na-
tion's constitutional system is not challenged directly, for the admission
that the exercise of power is unlawful is also a recognition of the con-
tinued authority of the Constitution. Action taken in such circum-
stances, especially if only temporary, may not seriously weaken
governmental or public respect for the Constitution, beyond creating a
degree of disenchantment due to its apparent failure to cope with the
crisis. The Constitution and the institutions established by it will re-
main legally intact despite the immediate lack of legislative or judicial
control over the actions of the President. But the fact that executive
officers realize that they will be held liable in the courts (and, perhaps,
in Congress also) for their unlawful actions, and will rely on Congress
for indemnification, affords a restraining influence on them during the
crisis. 282 Moreover, the acknowledgement that the executive is acting
unlawfully underlines the extraordinary nature of the action taken, so
that the occasion should not be a precedent for like conduct except in
similarly exceptional circumstances.283
One difficulty with such executive action is that any notion of le-
gally binding "precise guidelines"2 84 governing the occasions when the
executive may act unlawfully would be inherently contradictory. At
most, such guidelines exert political or moral influence on the execu-
tive, especially if the courts or Congress employ them at a later date in
fixing responsibility and damages. For this reason some commentators
prefer to invest the executive with legal powers adequate to meet any
282. See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 69 (1849); Wilmerding, supra note 74, at
329, where a useful distinction is made between abuse of power and usurpation of power.
283. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting);
Schlesinger, The ImperialPresidency, in POWER AND THE PRESIDENCY 269, 275-77 (P. Dolce
& G. Skau eds. 1976); L. FISHER, THE CONSTITUTION BETWEEN FRIENDS 49 (1978); ut see
THE FEDERALIST, No. 25, supra note 213, at 167 (A. Hamilton); President Washington's
Farewell Address, September 17, 1796, 1 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra
note 69, at 220.
.284. See also Hurtgen, supra note 65, at 83.
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crisis. 285  This reasoning would grant the executive power to take
whatever action is considered necessary in the circumstances. But the
wisdom of this thesis as a question of political science need not concern
us, for we have seen that the United States Constitution does not grant
the President such broad authority.286
Presidential claims to exercise lawfully powers beyond those con-
ferred by the Constitution, strike at the very foundations of American
constitutional democracy.28 7 They challenge the continued existence of
every constitutional provision and doctrine-the separation of powers,
democratic government, federalism, 28 judicial review and the constitu-
tional protection of civil liberties.28 9 It is not an exaggeration to de-
scribe such claims as "revolutionary, 29 0 for, if successful, they would
285. See N. MACHIAVELLI, supra note 109, at 194, 195. See THE FEDERALIST, No. 25,
supra note 213, at 167 (A. Hamilton). Cf. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 225
(1944) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Fairman, Government Under Law in Time of Crisis, in
GOVERNMENT UNDER LAW 117, 120-21 (A. Sutherland ed. 1956); and Friedrich & Suther-
land, Defense of the Constitutional Order, in STUDIES IN FEDERALtSNM 693 (R. Bowie & C.
Friedrich eds. 1954).
286. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 649-50 (1952) (Jack-
son, J., concurring).
287. See A. SCHLESINGER, Epilogue, supra note 133, at 450-52.
288. See also L. HENKIN, supra note 14, at 23.
289. Cf. Curtis, supra note 72 at 320. In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,
299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) Sutherland J. held that the United States government's extra-consti-
tutional foreign affairs power, "like every governmental power, . . . must be exercised in
subordination to the. . .Constitution," but gave no reason for this N iew. Accord Zweibon
v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 619-620, 626-627, 627 n. 85, 699, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 944 (1976); United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 603, 011, 631 (3d Cir.), cert.
deniedsub nom. Ivanov v. United States, 419 U.S. 881 (1974). See also Reid v. Covert, 354
U.S. 1, 6 (1957). But see Dr. Levitan's narrow interpretation of Justice Sutherland's dictum
Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Anaysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland's Theory, 55
YALE L.J. 467, 490 (1946). On the ground that they envisaged extra-constitutional powers in
the field of foreign relations, it may be argued that the Bill of Rights applies to those powers
because "the framers of the Bill of Rights might well have sought to protect the people even
against excesses in the exercise of sovereign, extra-constitutional powers.": L. HENKIN,
supra note 14, at 253. But the framers of the Bill of Rights did not contemplate extra-
constitutional domestic powers, and since Sutherland J. denied their existence, supra 299
U.S. at 315-16, he cannot have intended his dictum to apply to them.
The Ninth Amendment to the Constitution has been regarded as a recognition that the
rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights predate it and do not owe their existence to it (see
Kauper, The Higher Law and the Rights of Man in a Revolutionary Society, 18 LAW
QUADRANGLE NOTES (Univ. of Michigan), No. 2, p.8, at 11, 13-14 (1974), P. KAUPER, THE
HIGHER LAW AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN IN A REVOLUTIONARY SOCIETY 8, 16-17 (1974);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 488-493 (1965); but see id at 520), so an argument
that even extra-constitutional powers are subject to the Bill of Rights might derive some
support from that amendment. Yet, it may be asked, why should the Ninth Amendment
operate in the realm of extra-constitutional authority when other constitutional provisions
are ignored?
290. See A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 4, at 266.
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effectively change the grundnorm of the American constitutional system
from the supremacy of the United States Constitution to the supremacy
of the President.
It might be argued that matters would never reach that extreme
stage, because there is no reason to adopt an all-or-nothing approach to
the exercise of extra-constitutional power. Theoretically, that may be
true; but the difficulty, indeed illogicality, of defining limitations to the
exercise of such power must be recognized. Once the President has
lawfully entered the realm of extra-constitutional power there is no log-
ical legal limit to his authority.29' Only the Constitution (and statutes
enacted pursuant to it) can fix the legal boundaries of the exercise of
executive power. Once the Constitution is removed as the frame of
reference for the lawful exercise of authority, the only substitute is the
balance of political-and, ultimately, military-power in the nation.
No one can suppose that such powers are compatible with American
constitutional democracy as we know it.292
Nor should it be imagined that political and party influence would
prevent the President becoming a despot. Abraham Lincoln may have
"successfully demonstrated"-to a grateful posterity, if not to his con-
temporaries--"that, under indisputable crisis, temporary despotism
was compatible with abiding democracy. ' 293 But not every leader
shares Lincoln's integrity and idealism. Governments have been
known to foment disorder deliberately in order to find an excuse for the
employment of arbitrary powers in suppressing it.294 Clearly, the
credence ultimately attached to political controls on the President will
vary with one's conception of the lessons taught by Watergate.29 5 As
291. See also Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Constitutionali y of the Bill/or Establish-
ing a National Bank (1791), 19 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 276 (J. Boyd ed. 1974):
"To take a single step beyond the boundaries. . specially drawn around the powers of
Congress, is to take possession of a boundless field of power, no longer susceptible of any
definition;, I ANNALS OF CONG. 514 (Gales ed. 1789) (remarks of Rep. White).
292. See Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland's
Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467, 493, 494, 497 (1946). Cf. the concern at the width of the powers
presently delegated by Congress to the President voiced by the Senate Special Committee on
the Termination of the National Emergency and by witnesses appearing before it. See
EMERGENCY POWERS STATUTES, supra note 113, 1973 Hearings, supra note 65. See also
National Emergencies Act, Pub. L. No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1255 (1976); International Emer-
gency Economic Powers Act, Pub. L. No. 95-223, 91 Stat. 1626, (1977).
293. See A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 4, at 65. In Lincoln's pithy metaphor, he could not
believe "that a man could contract so strong an appetite for emetics during a temporary
illness as to persist in feeding upon them during the remainder of his healthful life." E.
CORWIN, ESSAYS, supra note 75, at 23-24.
294. See 4 L. RADZINOWICZ, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW 243 (1968).
295. For optimistic views of such controls, see Hurtgen, supra note 65 at 75-76; Roche,
supra note 179, at 611. We are less sanguine, and would argue, with Justice Jackson, that
45
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Justice Davis observed, with greater prescience than was realized at the
time, "[w]icked men, ambitious of power, with hatred of liberty and
contempt of law, may fill the place once occupied by Washington and
Lincoln." '296
"emergency powers are consistent with free government only when their control is lodged
elsewhere than in the Executive who exercises them." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 652 (1952). See also Friedrich & Sutherland, supra note 285, at 693;
National Emergencies Act, Pub. L. No. 94-412, § 202, 90 Stat. 1255 (1976); International
Emergency Economic Powers Act, Pub. L. No. 95-223, §§ 204, 207, 91 Stat. 1626, 1627-29
(1977).
296. Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 125 (1866).
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